Publications
4-2021

Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management: Implications for the SOF
Future Operating Environment
J. Philip Craiger
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, philip.craiger@erau.edu

Laurie Lindamood-Craiger
Cubic Defense Applications, Inc

Diane M. Zorri
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, mayed@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/publication
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Information Security Commons, and the Military
and Veterans Studies Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Craiger, J., Lindamood-Craiger, L., & Zorri, D. M. (2021). Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management:
Implications for the SOF Future Operating Environment. , (). Retrieved from https://commons.erau.edu/
publication/1569

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
commons@erau.edu.

JSOU Report 21-3
The emerging Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) concept assists at
all levels of the supply chain in managing and mitigating risks, and the authors
define C-SCRM as the process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks
associated with the distributed and interconnected nature of information and
operational technology products and service supply chains.
As Special Operations Forces increasingly rely on sophisticated hardware and
software products, this quick, well-researched monograph provides a detailed
accounting of C-SCRM associated laws, regulations, instructions, tools, and
strategies meant to mitigate vulnerabilities and risks—and how we might best
manage the evolving and ever-changing array of those vulnerabilities and risks.

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

Craiger/Craiger/Zorri

Joint Special Operations University
7701 Tampa Point Boulevard
MacDill AFB, FL 33621

Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management

Alan Estevez, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, addresses U.S. Special Operations Command acquisition employees on current issues
within the Department of Defense acquisition community during the Special Operations Forces
Acquisition Summit held at U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL, 30 October
2014. Photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant Angelita Lawrence.

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

Cyber Supply Chain Risk
Management:
Implications for the SOF Future
Operating Environment
J. Philip Craiger, Laurie Lindamood-Craiger, and
Diane M. Zorri
JSOU Report 21-3

ISBN 978-1-941715-51-2

Joint Special Operations University and the
Institute for SOF Strategic Studies (IS3)
The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) generates, incubates, and propagates (delivers and communicates) ideas, education, and training for expanding and
advancing the body of knowledge on joint and combined special operations. JSOU is
a ‘hybrid organization’ that performs a hybrid mission—we are a ‘corporate university:’ an academic institution serving a professional service enterprise, ‘by, with, and
through,’ the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). As such, we
are both a direct reporting unit to the Commander, USSOCOM, on all Combined
Joint Special Operations Forces (CJSOF) education and leader development matters,
as well as the educational and leader development component of the Command.
The JSOU Mission is that JSOU prepares Special Operations Forces professionals to address strategic and operational challenges, arming them with the ability to
think through problems with knowledge and insight. Our Vision is to constantly
strive to be(come) USSOCOM’s “think-do tank,” world-class leader in “All Things”
CJSOF strategic and operational education, training, and leader development, and
the advancement of knowledge on the utility of CJSOF, for the Nation. We pursue
this mission and vision through our best-practice teaching & learning, research
& analysis (R&A), and engagement & service-outreach operations, activities, and
initiatives. We achieve these outcomes-based goals by providing specialized joint
professional military education, developing SOF-specific and unique undergraduate,
graduate, and post-graduate-level equivalent curriculum, and by fostering special
operations-focused R&A and outreach, in support of USSOCOM objectives and
United States national and global strategic goals.
JSOU carries forward its R&A roles and responsibilities led by, and through its
IS3, where our efforts are guided and informed by the most current U.S. National
Security, Defense, and Military Strategies, and the USSOCOM Mission: USSOCOM
develops and employs fully capable Special Operations Forces to conduct global special
operations and activities as part of the Joint Force to support persistent, networked,
and distributed global Combatant Commands operations and campaigns against state
and non-state actors, to protect and advance U.S. policies and objectives.

Sharpening the Edge of SOF’s Advantage: The All-Domain SOF Leader-Professional

Joint Special Operations University
Isaiah “Ike” Wilson III, Ph.D., HQE, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret., President
Scott M. Guilbeault, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Vice President
Shannon P. Meade, Ph.D., Director, Institute for SOF Strategic Studies (IS3)
Christopher Marsh, Ph.D., Political Science, Director, Center for Strategic Research
Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor
Claire Luke, Part-time Editor and Layout Designer
IS3 Professors
Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.
Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.
David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics
A. Jackson, Ph.D., International Relations
Mark G. Grzegorzewski, Ph.D., Government

JSOU Press publications are available for download at
https://jsoulibguides.com/jsoupublications.
Print copies available upon request by writing
jsou_research@socom.mil.

Sharpening the Edge of SOF’s Advantage: The All-Domain SOF Leader-Professional

Cyber Supply Chain Risk
Management:
Implications for the SOF Future
Operating Environment
J. Philip Craiger, Laurie Lindamood-Craiger,
and Diane M. Zorri
JSOU Report 21 -3

The JSOU Press
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
2021

Recent Publications of the JSOU Press
Mazar-e Sharif: The First Victory of the 21st Century Against Terrorism, JSOU Report
21-2, William Knarr, Mark Nutsch, and Robert Pennington
The Blurred Battlefield: The Perplexing Conflation of Humanitarian and Criminal
Law in Contemporary Conflicts, JSOU Report 21-1, Patrick Paterson
Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative
Analysis, JSOU Report 20-5, Diane Zorri, Houman Sadri, and David Ellis
Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs in Great Power Competition,
JSOU Report 20-4, Travis Clemens
Informal Governance as a Force Multiplier in Counterterrorism: Evidence for Burkina
Faso, JSOU Report 20-3, Margaret Ariotti and Kevin Fridy
Village Stability Operations and the Evolution of SOF Command and Control in
Afghanistan: Implications for the Future of Irregular Warfare, JSOU Report 20-2,
William Knarr and Mark Nutsch
On the cover. U.S. Marine Corps Corporal Railee Reed, a satellite controller with
9th Communication Battalion, I Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group,
operates a very small aperture terminal-large at Marine Corps Base Camp in Pendleton, California, on 25 February 2020. Photo by U.S. Marine Corps Lance Corporal
Isaac Velasco.
Back cover. Alan Estevez, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, addresses U.S. Special Operations Command acquisition employees on current issues within the Department of Defense acquisition
community during the Special Operations Forces Acquisition Summit held at U.S.
Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL, 30 October 2014. Photo by U.S. Air
Force Staff Sergeant Angelita Lawrence.

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
April 2021.
ISBN 978-1-941715-51-2

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position
of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United
States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations
University.

Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to
the Director, Institute for SOF Strategic Studies, Joint Special Operations
University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.
*******
The JSOU Institute for SOF Strategic Studies is currently accepting written works
relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information, please
contact the Director, Institute for SOF Strategic Studies at jsou_research@socom.
mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press.
*******

Contents
Foreword.......................................................................................vii
About the Authors...........................................................................xi
Introduction.................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1. Modern Warfighting Technologies and
the Supply Chain Problem.............................................................. 7
Chapter 2. Supply Chains, Threats, and Mitigation Strategies........ 13
Chapter 3. The SOF Supply Chain Problem................................... 23
Chapter 4. Government Regulations for C-SCRM.......................... 37
Chapter 5. The Hyper-Enabled Operator (HEO) and
the Supply Chain.......................................................................... 45
Chapter 6. SOF Acquisition.......................................................... 63
Conclusions and the Future of SOF Acquisition............................ 69
Acronyms..................................................................................... 73
Endnotes....................................................................................... 77

v

Foreword

A

dvancements in information collection, communications, weapons, and
their associated technologies have often propelled their wielding armies
to extraordinary successes. These product advances and their supply chains
have always required protections against exploitation, sabotage, and attack.
In this monograph, the authors comprehensively describe this maxim as a
requirement in today’s increasingly compounded environment, and nowhere
is this more evident than in the Department of Defense (DOD) cyberspace
supply chain.
The authors have composed a well-researched monograph for laypersons,
decision-makers, and leaders without technical government acquisition and
procurement backgrounds. They examine the DOD’s cyber supply chain
risk management (C-SCRM), demonstrating the real risk and vulnerability
implications, current processes, policies, and associated risk-mitigating efforts
currently underway. This research offers the reader a hypothetical, scenariobased cyber-threat practical application exercise—identifying how special
operators may become more resilient to cyber threats in their supply chain
through awareness of potential adversary attack vectors across a product’s
life cycle—and concluding with their thoughts on the future of special operations acquisitions.
Advanced battlefield adaptations provide substantial force multipliers, and
significantly contribute to improvements in force lethality, efficiency, and cost
reductions. Across the military communications, command, and control’s
global connectedness of today’s battlefield and tomorrow’s hyper-enabled
operator (HEO)—with thousands of networked weapons and communication
devices, sensors, and streaming data all containing a multitude of diverse,
complex, and commercially available hardware and software—there is an
ever-expanding reliance placed on the cyberspace domain.
Through advances in communications technology, reductions in trade
barriers, production and shipping costs, and an increase in international
connections, the cyberspace vulnerabilities to military products and their
supply chain have become progressively inherent in a product’s life cycle.
From concept to disposal, product interaction with precarious and often
murky supply chain realities—consisting of multiple tiers of outsourced
vii

contractors, subcontractors, manufacturers, and material suppliers that are
increasingly diversified, fluid, and global—and the DOD’s current acquisition
strategies make it increasingly challenging to determine cyberspace risks in,
or to, the delivered products.
Modern warfare has transformed into blended—physical and cyber—
operations, and the supply chain is under increasing compromise by cyber
threats. The stated compounding variables exponentially increase the potential exploitation of cyberspace product vulnerabilities by nefarious adversaries. This access may readily concede product security, integrity, and operating
capability and have profound implications for mission success. Given the
enormity and gravity of these challenges, how can the DOD and other federal
entities protect and secure their cyberspace supply chain against adversary
hacking, exploitation, disruption, or destruction?
As the authors adequately present, the notion of C-SCRM and resiliency is
still a nascent and evolving concept; furthermore, they promote that C-SCRM
is a distinct requirement originating from the U.S. government’s acquisition
strategy—pivoting from program-specific to commercial off-the-shelf products for missions and systems.
The emerging C-SCRM concept assists at all levels of the supply chain
in managing and mitigating risks, and the authors define C-SCRM as the
process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with
the distributed and interconnected nature of information and operational
technology products and service supply chains.
As Special Operations Forces increasingly rely on sophisticated hardware
and software products, this quick, well-researched monograph provides a
detailed accounting of C-SCRM associated laws, regulations, instructions,
tools, and strategies meant to mitigate vulnerabilities and risks—and how we
might best manage the evolving and ever-changing array of those vulnerabilities and risks.
Militaries will continue to evolve and seek out advanced software and
hardware products, expanding their dependence on internet connectivity and
cyberspace operations; therefore, we should expect everyone in the profession
of arms to possess a basic understanding of C-SCRM. If the Cybersecurity
Maturity Model, the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, the
Committee on National Security Systems, and the Cybersecurity & Acquisition Lifecycle Integration Tool are unfamiliar to the reader, this monograph
will undoubtedly provide critical insights and lessons for those interested in
viii

learning and subsequently contributing to this expanding and required field
of study.

Mark Raney
Deputy Director, Institute for SOF Strategic Studies
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Introduction

M

aersk is the world’s largest container shipping company, with more
than 800 seafaring vessels—many of which are enormous container
ships, carrying millions of tons of cargo yearly throughout the world. Maersk
accounts for a fifth of the entire world’s shipping capacity.1 In June 2017, a
single internet-connected computer residing on Maersk’s network became
infected with a type of malware2 called ransomware. Encryption effectively
corrupts the computer’s operating system and data files, rendering the computer inoperable until the files are decrypted, which returns the files to their
original state. The ransomware spread quickly across Maersk’s global information technology (IT) infrastructure, encrypting hard drives across 170
Maersk global offices, forcing recovery efforts to the entire IT infrastructure. Software and files were reinstalled on over 4,000 servers, 45,000 PCs,
and 2,500 applications over a ten-day period.3 The spreading mechanism
embedded in the ransomware exploited two vulnerabilities in versions of
the Microsoft Windows operating system. The first was a vulnerability in a
Windows file sharing protocol that allows Windows-based computers to read
and write files to and from other Windows-based computers on the same
network. The second vulnerability was that some versions of Windows were
known to leave users’ passwords in the computer’s working memory, and
therefore potentially accessible to a technically inclined malign actor.4 Once
a single computer was infected, these vulnerabilities allowed the ransomware
to automatically spread across Maersk’s IT global infrastructure, infecting
computers in other offices throughout the world.
The ransomware attack resulted in the incapacitation of Maersk’s IT
infrastructure; almost all office computers were inoperable, disrupting the
company’s ability to accept shipping orders and stranding millions of tons
of freight in transit. Port terminals in the United States, India, Spain, and
the Netherlands—all run by Maersk—experienced massive disruptions.5
Although the computers on the cargo container ships were not affected,
Maersk’s office computers—most of which contained the logistics programs
and information on their supply chain—were inoperable. Even when the
container ships were able to dock at a port, the thousands of semi-trailer
trucks that pick up and distribute cargo were unable to collect their cargo,
1
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as there was no way of knowing which containers were on the ships or the
cargo that was inside.6
The origin of this event was speculated to be a by-product of a state-onstate cyber offensive, part of the ongoing political conflict between Russia
and Ukraine.7 The ransomware was cleverly designed to automatically spread
across a network when a single computer is infected. Unfortunately, the
ransomware’s spreading mechanism worked too well; it spread to computers
on non-Ukrainian networks across the globe.8 Several other global companies were affected by the ransomware, including the pharmaceutical company Merck, FedEx, the French construction company Saint-Gobain, snack
company Mondelēz, and British manufacturer Reckitt Benckiser.9 The U.S.
government estimated that over $10 billion was lost due to the ransomware,
and some have argued that figure was a conservative estimate.10
Of course, this does not tell the entire story of the effects of a ‘glitch’ in
the supply chain. Clearly Maersk was affected, but also trucking companies,
supply chain vendors waiting on the delivery of parts, distributors, and millions of customers and end-users. The intent of the malign actors was not to
affect the supply chain, but the unintended side effects did just that. In the
end it does not matter what the intent was, the effects on the supply chain
were catastrophic.
As warfighting technologies have increasingly integrated information
communications technology (ICT)—sophisticated hardware and software—
there have been attendant changes in the worldwide supply chain.11 The
supply chain has transformed dramatically over the last few decades. Historically, the DOD mission needs could be met primarily through programspecific products—typically, custom designed and manufactured systems
supplied by contractors. More recently and concurrent with advances in ICT,
there has been a shift to commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and open
source software where feasible and practical, as well as an increased reliance
on non-U.S. suppliers via a “globalized market.”12 While these changes have
led to significant improvements in efficiency and cost-effectiveness for the
DOD, these changes have produced greater risks for DOD missions.13 COTS
products often rely on an even more complex and dynamic supply chain as
smaller suppliers may change on an unpredictable basis. Custom weapons
and support systems designed and built by contractors for specific mission
needs most likely contain at least some COTS components (e.g., microelectronic components, software libraries, etc.), and, potentially, components
2
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from non-U.S. suppliers. Accordingly, the DOD’s current acquisition strategy presents the prospect of emerging threats in the supply chain through
cyber compromise—either through intentional acts by malign actors, or
unintentional acts by suppliers. Consequently, the government has pursued acquisition regulations and guidelines to assist in the mitigation and
management of these threats. In this monograph, the authors describe the
modernization of warfighting and the DOD’s increasing reliance on ICT;
the changing nature of supply chains and threats due to cyber compromise
and their potential impact on SOF missions; and current as well as emergent
government acquisition regulations and guidelines to mitigate and manage
cyber supply chain threats.

Audience and Objectives
This monograph was written for a non-technical audience working with government acquisitions and procurement—including subcontractors, supply
chain vendors, and risk managers. Additionally, decision makers in the
supply chain—including those in acquisitions, cybersecurity, or IT—may
find this monograph useful as it provides a context for the changing nature
of supply chains; attendant cyber threats and risks; existing and emergent
government guidelines and regulations affecting acquisition; and currently
available tools to help mitigate risks for procurers and supply chain vendors.
The authors will use the following framework to address issues regarding supply chain threats and mitigation strategies, focusing on its effects on
Special Operations Forces (SOF) mission readiness and capabilities:
Chapter 1. Characterizes the modernization of warfighting and increased
use of ICT, and the attendant changes in supply chains;
Chapter 2. Introduces the subject of supply chains, threats, and threat
mitigation strategies, including the notion of C-SCRM;
Chapter 3. Analyzes the supply chain from a SOF perspective—threats to
the SOF supply chain, including historical threats and attacks on supply
chains, as well as ramifications of cyber compromise in the supply chain;
Chapter 4. Describes existing government regulations, as well as emergent guidelines and regulations regarding government acquisition and
procurement as a means of mitigating threats;

3
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Chapter 5. Presents a hypothetical scenario of a warfighter as part of a
larger system of smart, portable, and network-connected devices on the
battlefield, and potential cyber threats at each stage of the life cycle of
the warfighting systems;
Chapter 6. The authors discuss current SOF acquisition entities and
practices, as well as other tools and emergent processes that can assist in
securing the supply chain, as well as educating those involved in acquisition and procurement;
Conclusions. The authors then conclude with a discussion of the future
of SOF acquisition.

The primary research question is: How can special operators become
more resilient to cyber threats in their supply chain? To answer this question, the authors' research addresses threats to the cyber-resilience of the
supply chain, the potential effects of cyber compromise on the warfighter,
and how SOF can mitigate threats to their supply chain. To examine future
uncertainties, the authors include a hypothetical scenario-based case study
featuring the future, hyper-enabled warfighter as part of an integrated system
comprised of smart, portable, network-connected technologies, addressing
cyber threats at each stage of the system life cycle. This method allows the
researcher to create plausible future scenarios based on a process-tracing of
current technological trends, thereby showing a series of alternative potential events. Because technology changes so rapidly, the scenario-based case
study methodology provides a logical framework for researching not only
the threats and vulnerabilities, but also mitigation strategies.

Definitions
Although this monograph was written for a non-technical audience, to
provide accurate descriptions of cyber threats requires the use of cyberrelated terminology—some of which may be foreign to readers—yet likely
to be encountered for those working in acquisition and procurement as
government guidelines and regulations emerge to mitigate cyber threats.
The authors provide, in the following, brief definitions of this terminology.
These definitions level the bubble, making sure that everyone understands
the terms used.

4
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Cybersecurity: The process of protecting information and information
systems by preventing, detecting, and responding to attacks. The objective is to reduce the likelihood that attackers can access DOD systems
and limit the damage if they do.14
Vulnerability: A weakness in a system that could be exploited to gain
access or otherwise affect the system’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability.15 Confidentiality involves limiting system and information access
to authorized users and for authorized purposes only; integrity involves
ensuring information and systems are not modified by unauthorized
users and that the systems function as designed; and availability involves
ensuring information and services are available to authorized users when
needed.16
Threat: Anything that can exploit a vulnerability to damage or impede
a system, either intentionally or unintentionally.17
Attack vector: The path or means by which a malign actor exploits a vulnerability. Sometimes used synonymously with the term “threat vector.”
Exploit: A method of attack that takes advantage of a vulnerability in a
system.
Cybersecurity risk: A function of the threat (intent and capabilities of the
malign actor), vulnerabilities (inherent or introduced), and consequences
(fixable or fatal).18 The extent to which a malign actor has the intent and
capabilities, combined with existing vulnerabilities and consequences,
will determine the amount of risk involved.
C-SCRM: The process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks
associated with the distributed and interconnected nature of IT/operational technology (OT) product and service supply chains. It covers the
entire life cycle of a system—including design, development, distribution,
deployment, acquisition, maintenance, and destruction—as supply chain
threats and vulnerabilities may intentionally or unintentionally compromise an IT/OT product or service at any stage.19
Cyber resiliency: Involves identifying and protecting critical system elements during a cyberattack to ensure that they can continue to operate,
possibly with limited capabilities.20

5
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Chapter 1. Modern Warfighting
Technologies and the Supply Chain
Problem

U

.S. SOF are facing unprecedented changes to their operating environment as sophisticated computer hardware and software have become
increasingly important as force multipliers for SOF’s warfighting capabilities. These technologies provide warfighters with enhanced resources surpassing technology of old; for instance, SOF’s fully integrated panoramic
night-vision goggles have no analogue technology from the Vietnam War.
Likewise, portable and lightweight communication systems permit satellite
communications to warfighters in the field—a profound evolution from
previous communications technologies. More recently, smart and portable
network-connected devices are increasingly deployed by the DOD. These
devices have robust applications that support information flow between
warfighters, aircraft, naval vessels, unmanned aerial systems, and command posts, forming a unified network that increases situational awareness,
response time, and risk assessment.21
The Chief Scientist of the U.S. Army Research Lab coined the term Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) for smart, portable, network-connected
devices that will transform the future of warfighting:22
In the future, military operations will rely less on human soldiers
and more on interconnected technology, leveraging advancements
in unmanned systems and machine intelligence to achieve superior
defense capabilities. The IoBT (Internet of Battlefield Things) will
connect soldiers with smart technology in armor, radios, weapons,
and other objects, to give troops “extra sensory” perception, offer
situational understanding, endow fighters with prediction powers,
provide better risk assessment, and develop shared intuitions.23

An early instance of IoBT involved U.S. Army helmets containing built-in
sensors that transmitted sensed health data to physicians over networks to
assist in diagnosing brain injuries.24 IoBT are increasingly deployed on the
battlefield, and their role will continue to expand in future warfighting.25
7
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Current and emergent warfighting technologies are composed of significantly more diverse, complex, and commercially available hardware components and software than any time in military history.26 The supply chain for
these technologies may involve sourcing from a hierarchy of suppliers—from
prime contractors, to Tier 1 through 4 subcontractors that provide hardware
components, software, and services to upstream and downstream suppliers
within the supply chain. Even lower tier suppliers, often small- and mediumsized businesses, are reliant on a global supply chain network.
Figure 1 is an illustrative yet oversimplified example of the complexities
of the global supply chain.27

Figure 1. 21st Century Global Supply Chain. Derivative from Insight
article created by authors.

As depicted in figure 1, the source of hardware components or software
may not be evident to other participants within the supply chain. For example, a procurer (e.g., Program Office) may only be able to identify the sources
to which it is directly connected in the supply chain.28 Additionally, the
intricacy of corporate structures can obfuscate the identity of downstream
suppliers, such as when parent companies and their subsidiaries control businesses using different names in multiple countries, which further obscures
the provenance of products.29 As such, the procurer may have little knowledge of its downstream suppliers. Knowing the suppliers of your suppliers
8
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can be daunting: in 2017, U.S. defense contractor Raytheon was estimated
to have 36,000 suppliers alone, and about 65 percent of those were also suppliers for other major contractors such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and
Northrop Grumman.30 The supply chain problem is further complicated
when suppliers change on a unpredictable basis, such as when suppliers are
acquired by or merged with another supplier—not unheard of for small- and
medium-sized businesses—further obfuscating provenance.
The difficulty of identifying the participants in the DOD supply chain
results in the futility of not only identifying the provenance of hardware
and software, but adherence by suppliers to DOD acquisition standards and
regulations as well:
DOD systems are exposed to threats of malicious insertion and
tampering throughout the development and supply of critical components from external and internal sources. This exposure is further
exacerbated by the use of a significant number of COTS parts that
are obtained through a global supply chain. Examples of malicious
insertion threats are widely publicized and include telecommunication switches that exfiltrate data and radar systems that are unable
to detect a particular country’s planes.31

Figure 2 displays the stages in the life cycle of a “product,” whether a hardware component, software, or an integrated system.32 Due to the complexity
of modern weapons systems, there may be many participants involved in
the supply chain, exposing opportunities for cyber compromise.33 Between
the inception of a component or a system and its final disposal, there are
several stages in the life cycle where it can be altered, moved, shipped, tested,
packaged, sold, used, and maintained. Likewise, components and systems
can encounter several different handlers, engineers, testers, logisticians, consumers, owners, and users during their life cycle. At each of these stages of
the life cycle, there are opportunities for malign actors to interfere with the
integrity of components or the systems themselves for malicious purposes.

Figure 2. Supply Chain Product Life Cycle. Graphic created from data in
Sandia Report by authors.
9
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Given the ubiquity and reliance on ICT in operational environments,
support, suppliers, and supply chains are under constant and increasing
threat of cyber compromise. State-of-the-art integrated weapons and support
systems employed by SOF warfighters could potentially contain cyber vulnerabilities—in hardware and/or software—and therefore require new risk
mitigation strategies.34 The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST)35 noted that cyber supply chain risks include insertion of counterfeit
components,36 unauthorized production,37 tampering,38 theft,39 insertion of
malicious software40 and hardware,41 and poor manufacturing and development practices in the supply chain.42 The DOD has acknowledged issues with
its supply chain in the last decade, where it was estimated that 15 percent of
spare and replacement parts have been identified as counterfeit.43 Counterfeit
electronic parts have been identified on U.S. Navy SH-60B helicopters, U.S.
Air Force C-130J, U.S. Coast Guard C-27J cargo planes, and the U.S. Navy
P-8A Poseidon aircraft.44
The effects of a cyber supply chain vulnerability are not confined to the
DOD; vulnerabilities can pass to federal agencies, enabling malign actors
to exfiltrate data, insert malicious content, or otherwise exploit these vulnerabilities, potentially resulting in the compromise of federal information
or missions.45 In response to threats to the cyber supply chain, the concept of C-SCRM emerged to assist all tiers of the supply chain in managing and mitigating risks. The DOD established additional requirements for
contractors which store, process, or transmit covered defense information
and implemented the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) clause 252.204.7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and
Cyber Incident Reporting.46 This clause was implemented by a rule released
in December 2015 which mandated compliance by contractors. The clause
required contractors and subcontractors to implement NIST Special Publication 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations,47 which lists 110 security
controls with which suppliers must be compliant, as well as implementing
new rules regarding cyber incident reporting. Contractors risk losing their
current federal contracts, and are potentially barred from future contracts
for noncompliance.48
In 2014, the NIST released Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Version 1.0, and a revised Version 1.1 in 2018, referred to as
the “Framework.”49 Although the Framework was designed to be voluntary,
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it provides a method for organizations to measure and manage risks. Version
1.1 implemented C-SCRM considerations and identified risks specific to the
supply chain, as well as subcontracted parts and materials.
The notion of C-SCRM and resiliency is still a nascent and evolving
concept as supply chains become more complex, fluid, unpredictable, and
globalized. In January 2020, the Undersecretary of
The notion of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment emphasized
C-SCRM and
the supply chain risk when she stated: “[a]dversaries
resiliency is still
know that in today’s great power competition envia nascent and
ronment, information and technology are both key
evolving concept
cornerstones … and attacking a sub-tier supplier is
50
as supply chains
far more appealing than a prime.” While the DFARS
become more
mandates compliance, many lower-tier suppliers—
complex, fluid,
often small- to medium-sized businesses—may be
unpredictable,
incapable of managing and meeting the requireand globalized.
ments imposed by these regulations, in contrast to
large, long-established, and therefore ostensibly more
robust suppliers (e.g., Lockheed, Boeing, Raytheon, BAE Systems, General
Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, etc.).51 But because of the risks inherent
in the supply-chain, even these latter suppliers are not immune to cyber
compromise.52
In 2017, The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force report Cyber Supply
Chain noted the warfighters’ increasing reliance on sophisticated ICT-based
weapons systems, and potential problems with the supply chain:
Modern weapons systems have depended on microelectronics since
the inception of integrated circuits over fifty years ago. Today, most
electronics contain programmable components of ever-increasing
complexity. At the same time, the Department of Defense (DoD)
has become a far less influential buyer in a vast, globalized supplier
base. Consequently, assuring that defense electronics are free from
vulnerabilities is a daunting task.53

As in the past, weapon systems will continue to leverage the latest technologies. Modernization requires increases in system complexity, meaning
more physical hardware components and more complex components.54 But
system complexity is not only defined by the number of physical hardware
11
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components or their complexity; equally important is the software that
defines the system’s functionality:
For many if not most DOD systems, software now defines function.
Software increasingly determines the boundaries, operation, and
risks to systems relied upon by all facets of civil society—consumerfacing, industrial, transportation, energy, healthcare, communications—as well as defense missions and management. Increasingly,
functionality is achieved through software. A modern aircraft may
have more than 10 million lines of code. The initial Block 1A/1B
F-35 had more than 8.3 million lines of code, and later version of
the aircraft will have more than 20 million lines of code for both
operations and support. Combat systems of all types increasingly
employ sensors, actuators, and software-activated control devices.55

Software is the computer instructions that connects weapon system’s
components, subsystems, and sensors.56 Some hardware components may be
designed for specific uses—e.g., microelectronics for a specialized heads-up
display. Other hardware are general purpose systems—e.g., COTS laptop
computers, smartphones, etc.—which might be composed of specific-use
components. Nonetheless, hardware systems cannot function unless software
is written to make use of the hardware’s capabilities.
Modernization introduces complexity into weapons systems in terms
of the number and complexity of hardware components, lines of software
code, as well as the complexity of the code. In concert, the supply chain for
hardware and software is increasingly diversified, fluid, and global. Consequently, there is concurrent increase in the attack surface for weapons and
support systems, meaning more and varied opportunities for malign actors
to attack the systems through hardware and/or software, through multiple
channels in the supply chain, and through all stages of a system’s life cycle
shown in figure 2.57
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Chapter 2. Supply Chains, Threats, and
Mitigation Strategies

F

or the purposes of this research, when describing supply chain and
supply chain management (SCM), the authors use a widely cited definition proposed by Mentzer, DeWitt, Keebler, Min, Nix, Smith, and Zacharia
in the Journal of Business Logistics.58 They defined the supply chain as a “set
of three or more entities (organizations or individuals) directly involved in
the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances, and/or
information from a source to a customer.”59 Meanwhile, they define SCM as:
The systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional business
functions and the tactics across these business functions within a
particular company and across businesses within the supply chain,
for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the
individual companies and the supply chain as a whole.60

Increases in the use of non-U.S. suppliers via a globalized market, and
the rise of ICT, has triggered rapid changes in the way businesses operate
within their supply chains.61 Virtual distance reduction, interactivity, disintermediation among supply chain participants, and the development of
new businesses—especially around digital product using the internet—has
significantly affected SCM. Additionally, an increasing reliance on the Internet of Things (IoT), small network connected computing devices—which
are covered in depth later in this monograph—have allowed for increasing
integration within supply chains of processes, people, and things.62 Modern
supply chains include contractors, suppliers, manufacturers, trading firms,
and transport firms that work in tandem in online networks, blurring the
lines between organizations.63 Geographic networks are now more diverse,
with more suppliers involved, and these supply chains move both tangible
and intangible assets—which can be prone to disruption.64 Accordingly,
operations structures are needed to manage risks including reputational,
intellectual property, and liability to maintain continuity of supplies.65 The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted the complexity and challenges of the federal ICT and communications supply chain:
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Federal information and communications systems can include a
multitude of IT equipment, products, and services, each of which
may rely on one or more supply chains. These supply chains can be
long, complex, and globally distributed and can consist of multiple
tiers of outsourcing. As a result, agencies may have little visibility
into, understanding of, or control over how the technology that
they acquire is developed, integrated, and deployed, as well as the
processes, procedures, and practices used to ensure the integrity,
security, resilience, and quality of the products and services.66

The conclusion can be drawn that disruption to the stability of the supply
chain can lead to undesirable consequences to the operational readiness of
DOD services—and more specifically, to SOF—because the more critical a
product is to mission success, the greater the consequences for any disruptions in the end-to-end supply chain, resulting in second and third-order
effects on mission outcomes.67
The very benefits of the global interconnected supply chain—rapid innovation, interoperability, low-cost, and product features—are the very things
that leave it vulnerable to supply chain compromises, whether intentional
or unintentional.68 To properly manage the supply chain, it is necessary for
participants in the supply chain
The very benefits of the global
to ensure the quality, integrity,
interconnected supply chain—rapid
security, and resilience of supply
innovation, interoperability, low-cost,
chain services and products to
and product features—are the very
prevent the introduction of
things that leave it vulnerable to
cyber supply chain risks such as
supply chain compromises, whether
unauthorized production, theft,
intentional or unintentional.
insertion of counterfeits, tampering, introduction of malicious hardware and software—and the risks presented when firms in the
cyber supply chain have poor development and manufacturing practices.69
As the supply chain underwent major transformations with the emergence and evolution of ICT, initial concerns regarding cyber security at the
federal level began surfacing in the 1990s—specifically, how U.S. national
security interests could be damaged due to the use of the internet and telecommunication systems.70 The electronic information systems supported
a wide range of activities, both in the private and public sectors, and these
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information infrastructures supported a wide variety of economic and security assets.71
In 2013, C-SCRM was identified as a distinct need due to changes in the
U.S. government’s acquisition strategy, with the government pivoting from
program-specific products to COTS products for missions and systems.72
This fact, combined with increased access to non-U.S. supply chain sources,
provided the U.S. government an opportunity to buy the best products at
lower prices.73 However, as the global ICT supply chain became more interconnected, it introduced the risk of malign actors exploiting these systems.74
While the COTS acquisition strategy lowered costs, the reduced visibility
and control throughout the life cycle of the supply chain led to an increased
risk of compromised components which could have malicious elements, be
counterfeit, or be flawed in some other way.75 The DOD’s increasing reliance
on ICT could lead to system vulnerabilities, allowing information such as
inventory or troop strength to be accessed by a malign actor—which could,
for example, negatively impact SOF mission outcomes.76 How then to best
manage this evolving and ever-changing risk?

C-SCRM
C-SCRM is an emerging area of both research and practice, and joins SCM,
risk management, and cybersecurity, incorporating practices from these
fields to manage the risks associated with the global interconnected supply
chain. In response to the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
(CNCI) #11—which addressed C-SCRM for non-national security information systems—NIST developed C-SCRM best practices with input from
academia, industry, and government.
The CNCI was established under President George W. Bush in January
2008, by the National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-D54/HSPD-23), but was kept confidential at
the time.77 The CNCI flowed from the 2003 Bush administration National
Strategy for Security Cyberspace policy, which recognized the existence
of cyber threats, and the need for a coordinated national response.78 The
administration established the CNCI to better protect agency networks
from malign actors such a foreign nation state, as well as from non-state
technical malign actors.79 The CNCI also worked to unify fragmented federal
agencies response to reduce the risks of threats to government networks.80
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At the time, the CNCI consisted of 12 components to improve the government’s cybersecurity by formalizing existing procedures and introduce new
business practices and policies to better protect government networks.81
Limited information emerged that one of the components of the CNCI was
to address the risk of malicious hardware and software that could be inserted
into a product or into a contractor’s network to allow malign actors a view
into the government’s data.82
In March 2010, President Barack Obama released a sanitized version of
the CNCI that was subsequently published on the White House’s website.83
One of the CNCI’s core goals was “to defend against the full spectrum of
threats by enhancing U.S. counterintelligence capabilities and increasing
the security of the supply chain for key information technologies.”84 CNCI
#11 specifically identified the risk that globalization of the ICT presented
opportunities for malign actors to use the supply chain to gain access to
data, interrupt communications, or alter data.85 Furthermore, the CNCI
acknowledged that the global supply chain must be managed over the entire
life cycle of services, products, and systems in comprehensive and strategic
ways—and that managing this risk required greater attention to vulnerabilities, threats, and consequences of acquisition decisions.86 CNCI #11 also
called for the development and use of resources and tools to mitigate risk
both technically and operationally across product life cycles from design to
retirement.87 The CNCI also recognized the importance of the acquisitions,
calling for new policies and practices that mirror the global market place
complexities.88
Concurrent with the government’s recognition of the need for C-SCRM,
there were growing calls for increased attention and research on C-SCRM.
There was a general recognition that C-SCRM was not widely understood by
academia or industry, and while C-SCRM was rapidly evolving, it was still a
nascent area of risk management research. While C-SCRM has its roots in
ICT management, there was growing recognition that risks expand beyond
ICT systems, requiring a merging of perspectives within the C-SCRM discipline. Academics recognized that C-SCRM bridged multiple disciplines
and practices: “[t]he cybersecurity problem does not fit conventional or traditional security categories based on individual security responsibilities,
economic or corporate security issues, military security problems, as well
as domestic versus international problems.”89
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The academic literature has provided C-SCRM models that have evolved
over time, and it is helpful to review the literature to understand how current definitions of C-SCRM were derived. As early as 2010, collaborative
efforts between industry, academia, and government resulted in an early
risk management framework (RMF) to address risks within the electronics
supply chain.90 The framework created a typology for the four types of risks
and mitigation strategies within the electronics supply chain:
1. If a firm is attacked by malign actors, the firm’s operational capabilities may be at risk.
2. If malign actors can infect computer systems with malware, a firm’s
operation and its data can be compromised.
3. In the event of an attack, the reputation of a firm and the trustworthiness of the firm are both at risk.
4. The existence of the firm itself is at stake if there is a loss of control or
competitive information.
Several strategies have been offered to address supply chain risks.91 First,
production should be mandatory and continual with alternate production
sources maintained to ensure continuity within the supply chain and avoid
the interruption of operations.92 Second, strict controls should be used to
guard against malware threats and the associated risks of corruption to
intellectual property.93 Third, seals should be used on electronic products,
and containers should be tracked and sealed as well to prevent tampering. Fourth, operational logs should be implemented to assist in identifying
responsible parties to help maintain trust.94 Finally, versioning control can
be used to prevent loss of information and intellectual property.95 The strategies used to manage risks relate various stages in the supply chain including
design, fabrication, assembly, and distribution. While simple, this was an
early approach to addressing and managing emerging supply chain risks.
Other researchers expanded beyond electronics products and focused
on the risks associated with enterprise SCM information systems—focusing
on the early IT implementation of these systems—and noting that interruptions to these systems could cause business losses.96 For example, a “lessons
learned” approach was used to create a RMF that integrated elements from
IT, supply chain, and risk management, and further identified the need for
17
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information confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.97 Due to its narrow
focus on implementation, this framework did not address life cycle C-SCRM.
Other research in this field used risk mitigation factors to determine
and assess threats.98 For instance, product criticality should be considered
because risks introduced in the end-to-end global supply chain can have an
impact on mission success.99 Threats and vulnerabilities should be identified
and prioritized, and countermeasures to mitigate risks identified.100 Then
firms can identify how best to allocate resources for risk mitigation using a
return-on-investment approach.
Given the increasing diffusion of software and hardware systems in the
supply chain, some have argued for a need to view C-SCRM as a blended discipline.101 Within a company, IT department goals—such as cutting costs—
may be at odds with other organizational goals, and structural integration of
the supply chain does not occur.102 Consequently, C-SCRM should combine
not only SCM and cybersecurity, but also incorporate enterprise-level risk
management practices.103
Nuances exist between the terms IT, cybersecurity, SCM, and C-SCRM.104
C-SCRM expands IT’s role beyond the firm itself, to include Tier 1 and
Tier 2 partners in the supply chain in order to provide greater control and
insight.105 Cybersecurity focuses on finding technical solutions for cyber
threats, whereas C-SCRM also considCybersecurity focuses on
ers broader supply chain disruptions and
finding technical solutions
integrates broader perspectives such as
for cyber threats, whereas
human factors and management.106 EnterC-SCRM also considers
prise risk management typically focuses
broader supply chain disrupon the top-down control of the business’s
tions and integrates broader
environment, and C-SCRM redirects this
perspectives such as human
focus to include the sometimes hidden,
factors and management.
but adaptive dynamic and global supply
chain.107
In 2011, the notion of a research-based capability/maturity model for
C-SCRM emerged.108 The federal government created a focus group of 19
participants, including the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Security Agency (NSA),
the DOD, and major suppliers to discuss the inception of a C-SCRM capability/maturity model.109 The focus group’s findings were combined with
other research to create a cyber supply chain framework. Subsequently, the
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government studied sixty public and private-sector organizations to evaluate the effectiveness of these organization’s C-SCRM standards and policy
initiatives in addressing end-to-end supply chain risks.110 The organizations’
initiatives were reviewed to determine how much they addressed each tier’s
key attributes using a three-tiered framework, which considered systems
integration, governance, and operations.111 The research findings suggested
that the organizations’ C-SCRM supplier-sourcing activities were found
only for key suppliers, meaning that organizations had little visibility or
knowledge of downstream suppliers.112
The focus group then created a C-SCRM capability/maturity model that
identified and classified practices as average, more advanced, or leading edge,
and then linked to the system integration, governance, and operations tiers.113
The model acknowledged that C-SCRM practices and performance could
then be categorized as emergent, diligent, and proficient in regard to the status
of the implementation of C-SCRM practices, and accordingly, if practices
were not implemented, but were planned, the organization would be considered emergent.114 If an organization was in the early stages of implementation
with ongoing implementation efforts, the organization would be considered
diligent. Organizations rated proficient would have process improvements
across the supply chain, and the implementation would be well-established.115
Others observed that while IT has the capability to maximize SCM, it
also opens organizations to vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malign
actors and therefore require cyber resilience strategies.116 This approach had
a narrower technical focus to managing cyber supply chain risks, focusing
on IT-based platforms to address cyber supply chain risks and maintaining
cyber resilience using cost-effective, push/pull services.117 It was advocated
that all parties—both industry and government—have data access in the
supply chain that is common and reliable.118 Pull services provide a way for
a supply chain organization to evaluate supply chain elements such as inventory levels of a supplier, shipment location, or even traffic conditions using
data pulled from integrated systems and are more suitable for managing
their supply chains.119 Push services permit organizations to send alerts such
inventory level or demand if unanticipated changes occur and address risk
and supply chain resiliency.120
Academics also investigated the idea of managing C-SCRM using an IT
systems engineering approach.121 Firms across the supply chain, including
end-user organizations such as SOF, may have different understandings of
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risk management objectives and different abilities to define and manage cyber
supply chain risks.122 Organizations within the supply chain may be motivated
by differing risks tolerances and appetites, and therefore make trade-offs in
C-SCRM accordingly, without considering other parts of the supply chain.123
To address this issue, C-SCRM stakeholders introduced systems engineering
concepts into the management of cyber supply chain risks, including security,
safety, reliability, trustworthiness, and quality.124
Some have made the case that C-SCRM must include additional functions
beyond IT due to the multiple potential failure points in the supply chain.125 These
areas include supply chain continuity from product sourcing, management of
suppliers, security, quality, and transportation. Additional functional management areas needed to manage cyber requirements include human resources,
strategy governance and controls, processes and standards, regulation and law,
research and development (R&D), supplier management, manufacturing, verification, audit, defects, secure delivery of services, and vulnerability resolution.126
Other researchers recommended a tiered maturity/capability model to
manage cyber supply chain risks, but expanded the organization’s activity to
downstream suppliers, consumers, and organizations.127 In this approach, ad-hoc
risk management characterizes Tier I as initial organizations, and these organizations partially follow C-SCRM practices.128 Management approval of C-SCRM
practices characterize Tier II as managed organizations—but operationally,
implementation of these practices may not occur and there is not repeatable
risk assessment.129 As with Tier II, organizations with approved management
practice characterize Tier III as defined organizations, but at this tier, repeatable risk assessment occurs and agreements and communications with the government, suppliers, and consumers have been established.130 Organizational
implementation of the highest level of C-SCRM practices characterizes Tier IV
as optimizing organizations, with continuous process improvement occurring
as well.131 Further, at this level real-time risk management occurs, and there is
coordination of C-SCRM with other consumers, suppliers, and organizations.132
Some researchers examined C-SCRM from the perspective of operations
and supply chain management and the challenges of preserving digital confidentiality.133 With greater systems integration comes a need for organizations to
understand the risks they face with this integration.134 Accordingly, C-SCRM is
seen as not just an activity that occurs within IT, but as something that also needs
to be incorporated in all business operations daily. The ability to maintain digital
confidentiality increasingly drives a firm’s viability and reputation—however,
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maintaining digital confidentiality can be in tension with increased system integration.135 The Occupational Classification System Manual literature identifies
high levels of digital integration among organizations within the supply chain
but does not consider the attendant risks this creates for firms trying to maintain
digital confidentiality, presenting a dichotomy between supply chain practice
and the literature.136
Other researchers identified IT supply chain risks as micro risk within a larger
supply chain risk management (SCRM) framework.137 Macro risks for SCRM
are relatively rare events, e.g., earthquakes or war, while micro risks refer to the
relatively routine activities that occur within an organization or its business
partners.138 Both macro and micro risks—including IT disruptions—should
be managed in a continuous manner.139 A four-phase approach was proposed
to manage cyber supply chain risk: identification, assessment, mitigation, and
monitoring.140
The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 required NIST
to provide agencies with the standards and guidelines needed to improve information security.141 As a result, NIST has taken a lead role for the federal government in consolidating a definition of C-SCRM—by taking a multi-disciplinary
approach to defining cyber terminology, and recommending strategies to deal
with cyber risks using input from government, industry, and academia.142
While NIST provides a suitable definition of C-SCRM, the GAO noted that
additional supply chain vulnerabilities can occur in “agency acquisition or security procedures, controls, or implementation related to an information system.”143
These vulnerabilities provide opportunities for malign actors to exploit the supply
chain. The GAO identified three categories of vulnerabilities in IT acquisitions:
(1) gray markets, (2) distributors, and (3) independent brokers who are not the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or an authorized reseller; those three
categories are all present risks in IT acquisitions. Another category of vulnerability exists in software updates and patches that have been inadequately tested.
Finally, the GAO acknowledged that there may be inadequate information on
suppliers of IT systems. These supply chain vulnerabilities, if compromised,
present risks to end users such as SOF, a point made by the GAO:
If a threat actor exploits an existing vulnerability, it could lead to
the loss of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the system
and associated information. This, in turn, can adversely affect an
agency’s ability to carry out its mission.144
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Chapter 3. The SOF Supply Chain Problem

S

OF weapons and support systems procurement relies on a complex,
dynamic, and sometimes unpredictable supply chain, with multiple tiers
of vendors supplying hardware, software, and services to upstream suppliers
and prime contractors in a complex chain of relationships. The life cycle of a
SOF weapons system can be years-long, from the initial concept and design,
to manufacture, deployment, maintenance, and at the end, disposal. Each life
cycle stage presents additional opportunities for cyber compromise. Cyber
compromise need not be intentional acts by malign actors. Unintentional acts
by suppliers, such as lack of due diligence, or inferior design, manufacturing,
and system testing practices, can also result
Unintentional acts by
in vulnerabilities and system compromise.
suppliers, such as lack of
Regardless of intent, vulnerabilities must be
due diligence, or inferior
identified, addressed, and mitigated.
design, manufacturing,
Vulnerabilities may be persistent and
and system testing pracnot apparent even after rigorous testing of
tices, can also result in
hardware components and software. For
vulnerabilities and system
instance, software development requires
compromise.
testing to confirm that software supports the
functionality specified in the requirements
and design stages. Unless the source code has been thoroughly reviewed
by programmers or software engineers, what is not apparent is the answer
to the question “what else does the software do?” It is difficult to identify
hidden functionality in compiled code,145 and this hidden functionality may
“execute” under certain specific conditions or a set time. For example, in
2002 a disgruntled employee successfully deployed a logic bomb against
UBS PaineWebber, his employer, after a dispute over his annual bonus.146 The
employee installed the logic bomb on 2,000 computers across 400 offices, and
set it to execute on 4 March 2002, at 9:30 a.m., whereupon it would delete
files on UBS servers and backup systems. On the appointed date and time,
the logic bomb executed, leaving over 17,000 brokers unable to make trades.147
From a DOD perspective, persistent, latent vulnerabilities can lead to mission failure in modern weapons systems, and the cause may be difficult to
distinguish from normal electronic or mechanical failure.148
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Hardware must also be subjected to testing, yet, it has the same issues as
software in terms of the potential for persistent, undetected vulnerabilities.
Even after extensive testing, vulnerabilities may not be identified until years
later. For example, in March 2020 a team of academics identified vulnerabilities in AMD Central Processing Units (CPUs)149 that were sold from 2011 to
2019.150 The vulnerabilities could theoretically allow a malign actor to exfiltrate information from the CPU. CPUs from another major manufacturer,
Intel, were also found to contain two similar vulnerabilities, one of which
dated back to 1995.151 As discussed later, identifying cyber vulnerabilities
with hardware is just as difficult as with software, and presents a malign
actor with opportunities for cyber compromise.
The nature of modern warfare has changed dramatically because of evolving and emergent ICT-based technologies.152 No longer are adversaries engaging the U.S. solely via kinetic means; they have moved to asymmetric warfare
with “blended operations that take place through the supply chain, cyber
domain, and human elements.”153 Malign actors can and do use multiple
attack vectors to trigger operational effects, thereby increasing the potential
for mission disruption. Four primary attack vectors used in asymmetric
blended operations include:154
• supply chain attacks through hardware, software, or services
• cyber-physical system (CPS) attacks through weapons systems or
industrial control systems
• cyber IT attacks through IT
• human domain attacks through insiders, foreign intelligence services,
or witting/unwitting actors
Although the preceding list of attack vectors separates supply chain as
its own category, the three remaining attack vectors can also play a part
within the supply chain, and therefore will be addressed accordingly. The
human domain is also divided into several subcategories, given that there are
multiple critical attack vectors within that category. The following discusses
each attack vector and provide descriptions of potential cyber threats as well
as historical examples of attacks.

Supply Chain Attack Vector
As noted earlier, each stage of the product life cycle presents new opportunities for cyber compromise by a malign actor—such as inserting a
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vulnerability or malicious functionality—or unintentional acts by insiders as the result of poor design, manufacturing, and/or testing practices
by suppliers. Regarding the former, consider a hardware implant inserted
into microelectronics by a malign actor during the manufacturing stage. A
hardware implant is an extra component that is manufactured into microelectronics that provides functionality not specified in the requirements
or design stages. This extra component might, for instance, allow a malign
actor to gain unauthorized access to a weapon or support system through
a backdoor, permitting the actor to access, add, modify, or delete critical
functionality or data stored on the device.155
In 2018, Bloomberg Business reported on the result of over a yearlong
investigation into a hardware implant allegedly traced to China.156 The
implant involved a supply chain attack by the Chinese motherboard 157
manufacturing company Supermicro, Inc.158 The story starts in 2015 when
Amazon considered acquiring Elemental, a company that develops and sells
hardware and software for compressing large video files. Elemental’s video
compression servers at the time were assembled by Supermicro, one of the
largest motherboard suppliers in the world, with Elemental being only one
of hundreds of Supermicro customers. Although Supermicro had several
production facilities throughout the world, including California, Taiwan,
and the Netherlands, Chinese contractors manufactured their motherboards.
In 2015, Elemental shipped several of these servers for testing to an independent third-party cybersecurity company. The security company identified
a small microchip, no larger than a grain of sand, that was not a part of the
motherboard’s original design specification. The finding was reported to
U.S. governmental authorities, causing alarm as the motherboards had been
purchased by numerous commercial and government entities. Particularly
concerning was that the motherboards were deployed on U.S. Navy warships,
as well as within the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) drone operations.
This finding started a multi-year classified government investigation into
Supermicro and its motherboards.
The government conducted further testing to identify the chip’s functionality. The chip was connected to the baseboard management controllers,
which are tiny computing devices connected to servers to provide computer administrators remote access to the device to troubleshoot or restart
the system remotely. Given its location, it was surmised that the microchip
served as a backdoor to the systems on which the motherboard was installed.
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Sources not identified by Bloomberg further asserted that the implants had
been installed during the manufacturing process by operatives from the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
The investigation identified 30 companies that had purchased the contaminated motherboards, including Apple Inc., a major bank, and several
government contractors. As reported by Bloomberg, further research by
Apple Inc. confirmed the hardware implants on the motherboards purchased
from Supermicro, and in 2015, Apple severed ties with Supermicro. Supermicro denied all allegations. Some security researchers expressed doubts about
the allegations regarding the functionality of the implant as unnecessarily
complex, cumbersome, and easily accomplished with software or firmware
instead.159,160 Meanwhile, others have expressed skepticism at the Bloomberg
report, including the NSA.161

CPS Attack Vector
CPS are smart systems that include interacting networks of physical and
computational components.162 ICT-based modern weapons systems are prime
examples of CPS. A 2018 GAO report described persistent and ongoing problems with DOD weapons system’s cybersecurity:
Multiple factors contribute to the current state of DOD weapon
systems cybersecurity, including: the increasingly computerized and
networked nature of DOD weapons, DOD’s past failure to prioritize
weapon systems cybersecurity, and DOD’s nascent understanding
of how best to develop more cyber secure weapon systems. Specifically, DOD weapon systems are more software and IT dependent and more networked than ever before. This has transformed
weapon capabilities and is a fundamental enabler of the United
States’ modern military capabilities. Yet this change has come at a
cost. More weapon components can now be attacked using cyber
capabilities. Furthermore, networks can be used as a pathway to
attack other systems.163

The GAO report noted that from 2012 to 2017, DOD security testers routinely identified critical cyber vulnerabilities in almost all of the weapon
systems under development.164 The testers used well-known penetration testing techniques and easily obtainable penetration testing tools.165 The testers
26

Craiger, Craiger, and Zorri: Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management
seized control of these systems and were able to largely remain undetected
by the system’s operators. When a system operator identified an intrusion,
in some cases, the operator was unable to effectively respond to the intrusion. The report noted that a two-person team gained initial access to a
weapons system in under an hour, and in a day the team was able to escalate privileges to take full control of the weapons system.166 After escalating
privileges, testers were able to move through the system unimpeded and
unnoticed. In one instance testers were able to view in real-time what the
operators were viewing on their console and could manipulate the system’s
controls. Additionally, multiple penetration testing teams were able to copy,
modify, or delete system data—including one team that downloaded over
100 gigabyte (GB) of data. Perhaps most disturbing, one team noted that
performing a simple passive scan caused a weapons system to shut down.167
Another team reported they were able to guess the system’s administrator
password in nine seconds. Some of the weapons systems incorporated COTS
and open-source software that had not been reconfigured with new passwords to replace default passwords shipped with the system. This allowed
testers to search the internet to identify the default passwords, which the
testers subsequently used to gain access and control the systems.
Note that the DOD cybersecurity testers were conducting “friendly”
cybersecurity tests in this case, causing no actual damage. Moreover, these
vulnerabilities were not alleged to have been inserted by malign actors, but
likely the result of poor design, manufacturing, and/or testing practices by
the DOD suppliers. Again, intent does not matter—the fact that systems
supplied by DOD vendors contained multiple cyber vulnerabilities is concerning. Malign actors, given the same opportunities, would undoubtedly
exploit the systems to take full advantage of the vulnerabilities to degrade
warfighters’ capabilities.

Cyber-IT Attack Vector
The fastest growing technologies involve devices contributing to the IoT.
These are smart sensor-enabled computing devices that coordinate and communicate over the internet. Common household examples of IoT devices
include home assistant speakers, smart thermostats, smart wall plugs, light
bulbs, light switches, home energy monitors, house door locks, pet feeders,
children’s toys, baby monitors, smart electric meters, smart watches and
27

JSOU Report 21 -3
phones, fitness trackers, smart refrigerators, washers and dryers, microwaves, smart TVs, and the ubiquitous home security camera, to list a few.
Statista Research predicted over 75 billion IoT devices will be connected to
the internet by 2025.168
As noted in the introduction, IoBT devices are increasingly deployed
by the DOD as they have robust applications that allow information flow
between aircraft, naval vessels, unmanned aerial systems, warfighters, and
command posts, creating a unified network that increases situational awareness, risk assessment, and response time.169 However, there are noted issues
with the use of IoT. The Chief Information Officer of the DOD indicated in a
2016 report, DOD Policy Recommendations for IoT, that the growing deployment of IoT devices on DOD networks increases the opportunities for cyber
compromise by malign actors:170
IoT is already upon us, with millions of these devices already
installed in our facilities, vehicles, and medical devices. The newest
DoD green buildings have tens of thousands of sensors. The growth
of internet-connected medical devices has been similarly exploding.
IoT devices have the potential to be incorporated in our weapons
and intelligence systems (both intentionally and unintentionally).
… However, the immense promise of this technology comes with
immense risks. While there have always been risks to DoD sensors
and controls, their proprietary nature and isolation limited the possibility of attack. Now, with such capabilities being given Internet
access, DoD is entering a quickly deepening pool of vulnerability.
At risk are all the things that embrace the Internet of Things (IoT):
DoD facilities, equipment, employees, and their possessions—any
of which could be used to cause harm.171

The report noted that IoT devices expand the DOD’s cyber-attack surface
through two means relevant to the supply chain. First, many DOD suppliers employ IoT devices during manufacturing and distribution, providing
malign actors with opportunities to compromise and disrupt critical manufacturing capabilities. Second, malign actors can compromise the IoT devices
themselves during their manufacture and distribution, potentially allowing
for the implant of backdoors that could allow unauthorized access to IoT
devices deployed on DOD networks. In the latter case, a malign actor need
not ‘hack’ into an IoT device because the device had been outfitted with an
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open backdoor during their manufacture. A backdoor allows a malign actor
access without authenticating to a system, thereby providing the actor with
remote access to not only to the IoT device, but potentially other systems
connected to the DOD network.
A reported example of an attack on an IoT device that allowed a malign
actor to connect to other computers on a network occurred in a North American casino. In this case, a malign actor penetrated an internet-connected
fish tank in the casino.172 The fish tank contained sensors that were coupled
to a computer that measured and regulated food, temperature, and water
cleanliness. Once the malign actor connected to the “IoT fish tank,” the actor
was able to connect to other computers on the casino’s network that stored
sensitive data, resulting in the exfiltration of 10 GB of data.173
The DOD report warned that IoT devices are designed and fielded with
minimal security requirements and testing, and the ever-increasing complexity and connectivity of networks could lead to widespread vulnerabilities in civilian and U.S. government infrastructures. This concern has been
underscored by leaders in the intelligence community. In his 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Director of
National Intelligence noted: “In the future, intelligence services might use
the IoT for identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and
targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.”174
In 2017, the GAO published a report on a study conducted on the security risks of IoT devices, due to their increasing use by the DOD.175 Table 1
displays the risks of IoT devices.176
According to the GAO report, there are multiple and varied risks involving IoT devices in how they are designed, manufactured, and configured,
and unfortunately, there is currently little incentive for some manufacturers
to invest in the design and implementation of robust security functions into
their products, although new government regulations may change this.177
A 2016 DOD report noted that IoT devices will be increasingly used on
the battlefield, and if not properly secured, could result in profound negative consequences for missions.178 The report provided an alarming scenario
involving warfighters on the battlefield:
Imagine that the enemy takes advantage of vulnerabilities in the
[IoT] devices or networking, hacking into or compromising these
devices and the information they supply. This may allow the enemy
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Table 1. Risks of IoT Devices
Device risk

Description of Concern

Supply Chain
Threat

The manufacturing origin of IoT devices and related components poses a significant
concern. Adversarial countries like China and Russia could embed “exploits,” or malicious software, into the hardware of chips and other components used in IoT devices,
such as smart meters, to collect and transmit data.

Limited Encryption

Limited encryption in the hardware of IoT devices or the collection and transmission
of unencrypted data poses a significant concern. IoT devices have not been designed
to facilitate deployment of the latest cryptographic algorithms and protocols, thus
posing a range of potential risks, to include eavesdropping, unauthorized access, and
device tampering.

Poor Security in
Device Design

Current IoT devices have limited security in the design of their hardware and software, including chip design and cybersecurity software. With little built-in security,
IoT devices could be compromised without the user’s knowledge.

Poor Password
Management or
Authentication

Poor password management or authentication protocols could lead to DOD industrial
control systems or personal IoT accounts being compromised or manipulated by
outside hackers.

Patch or Upgrade
Deficiencies

As the number of IoT devices increases, the probability of missing—or not implementing—a security upgrade or patch increases, and some devices may not be
patchable at all. In addition, a device could be kept in service longer than it is scheduled to receive security or management updates, which at least one DOD component
refers to as a “zombie device.” Any of these situations could lead to potentially vulnerable or exploitable devices by which malign actors could gain unauthorized access.

Operational Risks
Rogue Applications Some device applications—such as gaming applications—could be installed on
personal or even DOD smartphones or other devices, which then take pictures or
record the user’s locations. Such functionality of rogue applications could pose
security implications for DOD personnel or facilities.
Adverse Impacts
of Devices on
Operations
Security

IoT devices, including personal smartphones, can tag a person’s location—known
as geo-tagging—which presents implications for operations security. Officials from
three services noted the lack of awareness among their personnel over IoT device
capabilities in their environment and the need for behavioral changes.

Rogue Wireless
An increase in the number of IoT devices could significantly increase DOD’s vulnerDevices and Insider ability to cyber collection. Rogue wireless devices planted by an insider threat or
Threat
intentionally placed by service personnel (and then compromised) could collect
sensitive information or send out data on industrial control systems for purposes of
espionage.
Expansion of
Attack Surface

The expansion of IoT devices will significantly increase the number of points at which
any network can be attacked. IoT devices would provide more attack vectors into a
network and a potential platform for massive, distributed attacks.

Some IoT devices could by design collect and send data back to commercial
Unauthorized
Communication of providers, such as third-party help desks, and DOD components may have little
Information to Third insight into the internet destinations of such data.
Parties
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to provide false information to the warfighter and the supporting
remote organizations, making decisions and actions they take either
unreliable or dangerous. At the same time, they can also see the
information that should have gone to the warfighter, giving them the
advantage of the situational awareness and further allowing them
to take advantage of the confusion they have created through the
injection of false information into the warfighter decision making.179

The most devastating IoT attack in the civilian domain occurred in October 2016. Dubbed “Mirai,” the attack involved a malign actor identifying
vulnerable IoT devices on the internet,180 and then using a list of known
default credentials to gain access and infect the devices with malware.181
Once a device was infected, it transmitted the internet protocol address of
the newly infected device to the malign actor. Over 600,000 IoT devices were
infected and aggregated into a single interconnected entity called a botnet.
The malign actor could then send a signal to the botnet to direct massive and
overwhelming volumes of internet traffic to websites, rendering them essentially inoperable. Targets included a well-known cybersecurity researcher,
as well as the internet traffic company DYN, which provides services for
websites like Amazon, Spotify and Twitter.182 This attack effectively shut
down dozens of large websites for several days.
Botnets attack a system’s availability, which is the measure of reliable
uptime for server or networked computer systems. To maintain battlefield
supremacy, IoBT, servers, and networks need close to 100 percent uptime. It
is imperative the DOD provides protective and mitigation strategies against
attacks to damage availability.

Human Domain Attack Vectors
The average person thinks that cyberattacks require great technical skill and
that most attacks are of a technical nature; however, this is not the case. Bruce
Schneier, distinguished cybersecurity expert and chief technology officer of
Counterpane Internet Security, Inc., once said: “Amateurs hack systems. Professionals hack people.” 183 This quote highlights the number of non-technical
cyberattacks that are conducted daily against everyone who has a device
connected to the internet. Information systems are composed of not only
hardware, software, networks, and data, but people as well. As such, malign
actors exploit weaknesses in the psychology of human users to influence
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them to do something that allows the actor access to information or systems.
To do something could mean something as simple as clicking a web link,
clicking an email attachment,
As such, malign actors exploit weakfilling in a web form, or replynesses in the psychology of human
ing to an email. The psychologiusers to influence them to do somecal manipulation of humans is
thing that allows the actor access to
called social engineering, which
information or systems.
are attempts to trick a user into
revealing information that can
be used to attack computing systems or networks.184 The following describes
the more common social engineering devices.
Human Domain: Phishing
The most common social engineering attack involves phishing and its variants. Phishing is an umbrella term for several types of social engineering
attacks, and although a social engineering attack can occur through any
medium, including text messages, phone calls, regular mail, and even faceto-face, the most common attack vector is through email. Phishing attacks
are one of the most common cyberattack vectors across both government and
industry.185 Everyone with an email account has received a phishing email.
The goal of the malign actor is to use social engineering to dupe unsuspecting victims to react to the contents of the email. A phishing attack typically
involves the actor sending an email under the guise of a seemingly legitimate
offer, request, or demand. The malign actor uses a number of psychological
principles to influence a user to react to the message, including greed (“Free
$50 Amazon gift card!”), fear (a message from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service [IRS] regarding unpaid taxes), empathy (asking for help by a person in
distress), and vanity (a message from an attractive person asking to connect).
Other psychological forcers are often combined with these methods, such as
stressing urgency (“Offer expires at midnight!”) and appealing to authority
(the IRS example), to create a powerful incentive for the user to respond.
A more formidable variation of phishing is spear phishing. Spear phishing involves a message that appears to be from a source the user trusts, such
as a family member, friend, chief executive officer (CEO), boss, etc. These
attacks are successful because of the element of trust, and sometimes appeal
to authority as in the case of a message from a boss or CEO. Spear phishing
occurs less frequently than mass email phishing attacks because it requires
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additional research on the part of the malign actor. Additionally, whaling,
a variant of spear phishing, is a term where the target is a high-ranking
member of the organization, such as a CEO, board member, or government
or military decision maker/leader, etc.
A widely published example of a spear phishing attack involved John
Podesta, who at the time was Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair during her
2016 Presidential run.186 Podesta received a spear phishing email pretending to be from Google which indicated that someone from the Ukraine had
used his password to login to his Gmail account, and was urged to change
his password immediately.187 The email included an appeal to authority/
trust (Google), fear (someone from the Ukraine had his password), and
urgency (the message “You should change your password immediately.”).
After contacting his IT person about the email’s legitimacy, Podesta clicked
on a “Change Password” button, leading him to website that looked like the
Gmail login page, but was in reality a bogus website set up for the purpose
of stealing his username and password.188 Once the malign actor harvested
Podesta’s credentials, the actor logged into Podesta’s Gmail account and
downloaded his emails, which were subsequently published on the internet.189
Human-Domain: Business Email Compromise (BEC)/Email Account
Compromise (EAC)
One of the primary social engineering threats to small- and medium-sized
businesses is through BEC or EAC. In BEC attacks, malign actors rely on
social engineering techniques to trick unsuspecting employees into authorizing payment of invoices through wire transfer or other means. Email is
the primary attack vector.190 BEC is often facilitated by impersonating the
individual responsible for authorizing these wire transfers, such as a CEO or
other decision maker. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified
five forms of BEC attacks:191
1. Bogus Invoice Scheme. Malign actors pretend to be suppliers who
request wire transfer of funds to an account owned by the actors.
2. CEO Fraud. Posing as the company executive, the malign actors send
an email to finance department employees, requesting wire transfers
to an account owned by the actors.
3. Account Compromise. A company executives email account is compromised (e.g., through social engineering) by malign actors, who
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then send emails requesting payment of invoices to suppliers listed
in the companies email contacts.
4. Attorney Impersonation. Malign actors pretend to be lawyers from
a firm responsible for sensitive company business.
5. Data Theft. Human resources employees are targeted and compromised, typically through social engineering, to obtain personal identifying information regarding key company employees and executives,
which can later be used in further targeted attacks.
According to the latest FBI’s Internet Crime Report, there were 23,775
reports of BEC/EAC attacks in 2019, accounting for $1.7 billion in losses.192
Even experienced business owners and their employees are subject to these
types of attacks. “Shark Tank” judge Barbara Corcoran lost $388,700 in early
2020 through a BEC attack. A malign actor pretending to be Ms. Corcoran’s
assistant emailed an invoice for a renovation to Ms. Corcoran’s bookkeeper.193 The bookkeeper wired the funds to an account specified in the email.
However, the email address did not belong to her assistant, as the malign
actor had imitated her assistant’s email address by misspelling it by a single
letter.194 The mistake was not identified until the bookkeeper emailed the
assistant’s correct address for a follow-up. The business owner acknowledged
that she would not be able to recover the lost funds.
While the DOD and governmental agencies have multiple checks and
balances in acquisition, small suppliers that provide parts and services in
the supply chain are less likely to be able to implement stringent safeguards.
What if a small- or medium-sized business was attacked, resulting in the loss
of the supplier’s ability to provide the necessary components to other supply
chain participants? Small suppliers arguably are less likely to withstand concerted and persistence cyberattacks, as they may not have the resources or
expertise to put into place stringent safeguards.195 The impetus for a cyberattack may not even be related to the supply chain directly, it may have other
motivations—such as theft—which could result in a supplier not being able
to deliver. What happens if a critical component cannot be sourced from an
alternate supplier? What redundancies would allow a replacement such that
the supply chain could continue to function? The FBI warned that a supply
chain vendor’s current financial state, as well as their capability to meet
requirements with current and increased demand, should be considered an
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essential part of the supply chain review process.196 Additionally, a supplier’s
financial background should be critically reviewed, and consideration should
be given to the impact should the provider no longer be capable of fulfilling
requirements.197
Human Domain: Insider Threats
Insiders are one of the biggest, if not the biggest, threat to cyber systems.198
An insider is someone authorized to use a system and often has physical
access to the system. Examples of insiders include full- or part-time employees, and contractors. A nearsider is someone who only has physical access
but not granted logical access (i.e., username and password) to a system. For
example, a civilian touring a U.S. military installation would be considered
a nearsider. The DOD has recognized the potential threats from insiders:199
Some cyber threats also may come from insiders. Malicious insiders may exploit their access at the behest of foreign governments,
terrorist groups, criminal elements, unscrupulous associates, or on
their own initiative. Whether malicious insiders are committing
espionage, making a political statement, or expressing personal
disgruntlement, the consequences for DoD, and national security,
can be devastating.200

There are several reasons that insiders are insidious threats. Insiders
are normally vetted by their employers through background checks, and
after vetting, are provided logical access to systems and sometimes physical
access.201 Access provides the insider with increased opportunities for attacking a system. Insiders may also be able to socially engineer an escalation of
privileges to higher classified information and systems.202 Insider threats
need not be intentional; threats can also be unintentional or accidental as
noted by the GAO: “Insider threats include DOD personnel working directly
with adversaries to collect information or DOD personnel unintentionally
assisting adversaries through their inattention to cybersecurity (e.g., poor
cyber hygiene) or other actions.” 203
An alleged insider attack affecting the supply chain for personal protective equipment (PPE) during the COVID-19 pandemic occurred after a medical device packaging company terminated an employee.204, 205 The employee
had administrator access to computer systems containing shipping information, and had added an alternate administrator-level account on the systems
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prior to his termination.206 After the termination, the suspect was alleged to
have used the alternate account to remotely connect to the computers that
stored shipping information, where he edited roughly 116,000 records and
deleted roughly 2,400 records.207 These alterations disrupted the company’s
shipping processes, causing delays in the delivery of the equipment to hospitals and other healthcare providers.208
Well-known examples of vetted insiders with top security clearances who
exfiltrated classified information from U.S. intelligence or law enforcement
agencies, or the U.S. military include Edward Snowden209 (NSA), Joshua
A. Schulte210 (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), Robert Hanssen211 (FBI),
Aldrich Ames212 (CIA), and Chelsea Manning213 (U.S. Army). Of the five,
Snowden, Schulte, and Manning used cyber methods to exfiltrate substantial
quantities of classified information.214

Takeaways for the SOF Community
As described above, there are multiple methods of cyber compromise in
the supply chain, ranging from technically sophisticated attacks requiring great skill and resources, to mundane social engineering attacks easily
accomplished through an email. What this suggests is that the SOF community must take a multipronged approach to mitigate supply chain threats.
Increased vigilance regarding the provenance of hardware and software, as
well as rigorous testing of hardware and software, will be key determinants,
among other things, in mitigating any threats posed. Additionally, training,
education, and awareness programs regarding social engineering attacks is
a crucial factor in reducing the likelihood of these types of attacks occurring. Training, education, and awareness programs should be an ongoing
concern, provided annually, and not one-offs. Additionally, alternate sources
for products should be identified to ensure that the supply chain remains
unbroken should an attack effect a supplier of a crucial component.
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Chapter 4. Government Regulations for
C-SCRM

F

ederal agencies have increasingly been tasked with developing and
implementing regulations and guidelines to manage supply chain cyber
risks.215 The DOD, in particular, has supported the creation of new policies and management tools to address both the domestic and international
risks that exist within the supply chain across a program’s life cycle. These
efforts are intended to provide the government with an increased ability to
examine supplier C-SCRM practices so that greater supplier compliance
can be achieved.216 Managing supply chain risks is vital to ensure that the
products and services acquired can be delivered uncompromised to support
mission success.
For over 20 years, the U.S. government and other oversight bodies
have developed and issued regulations and guidelines for cybersecurity.217
However, just as there has been a growing and evolving understanding of
C-SCRM within academia, there has been an evolution within the government—including the DOD—about how to best mitigate these risks within
the supply chain. While the following discussion is not an exhaustive list
of applicable policies and regulations, it demonstrates the emerging understanding of the risks the DOD faces within the supply chains.
Prior to the 9-11 attacks, systemic analysis of shipments was not possible,
and supply chain risk management fell to risk management and insurance
providers.218 After 9-11, there was a new focus on physical security and more
structured methodological approaches, and supply chain risk management
shifted to include cyber in 2012.219 That year, a shift in orientation occurred
when President Obama signed the U.S. National Strategy for Global Supply
Chain Security, which identified the need for greater focus on cyber in
supply chains.220 Additional federal direction was provided in NIST IR 7622:
Notional Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information
Systems and NIST SP 800-161: Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for
Federal Information Systems and Organizations.221 NIST IR 7622 included
supply chain visibility and assurance methods, while NIST 800-161 incorporated the elements of NIST IR 7622, but provided greater measures for
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ICT by using strategies such as risk identification, risk assessment, and risk
mitigation.222
In February 2013, the government published Executive Order 13636,
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which tasked NIST and
stakeholders with developing a framework using existing practices, guidelines, and standards, to reduce critical infrastructure risks.223 The approach
in developing the framework emphasized repeatable, flexible, prioritized,
and cost-effective approaches to help manage cyber risk.224
On 14 March 2014 the DOD released DOD Instruction (DODI) 8500.01,
Cybersecurity—a foundational document that provides an updated posture
on cybersecurity.225 This update implemented a common cybersecurity terminology within the federal system, incorporating NIST’s SP 800-53 Security
Control Catalog which focuses on the implementation of early and continual
security measures in the acquisition process, and advocates for interoperability, integration, and operational resilience.226
Cyber risk management under the DOD is covered by the January 2017
Risk, Issues and Opportunities Management Guide for Defense Acquisition
Programs,227 and the RMF is a corresponding but discrete process.228 In 2014,
the DOD adopted the RMF for DOD IT when it released DODI 8510.01.229
RMF for DOD IT identified that all of DOD’s IT falls within the domain of
the RMF, and incorporates NIST’s RMF framework to align with the recommended processes used by both the intelligence and civilian communities.230
In addition to covering IT services and IT products, the RMF for DOD IT
also includes platform IT, information systems, IT R&D, and testing and
evaluation for both DOD products as well as contractor products and activities.231 Key changes from the prior DOD Information Assurance Certification
and Accreditation Process included replacing information assurance with
cybersecurity, replacing the Certification and Accreditation process with
the RMF life cycle, updating the security objective to confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and replacing DOD specific terminology with NIST SP
800-53 Security Control Catalog, the Committee on National Security Systems
Instruction (CNSSI) 4009, Glossary for Cybersecurity Terms, and CNSSI 1253
for categorization purposes.232
In 2017, the DOD issued the DFARS Clause 252.204-7012, Safeguarding
Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Report for all contracts and
requiring compliance by December 31, 2017, unless an acquisition was solely
COTS.233 There are four key elements that contractors must adhere to and
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flow down to their subcontractors if a subcontractor’s performance requires
the use of covered defense information, or the subcontractor provides operationally critical support.234 These elements include safeguarding covered
defense information, reporting cyber incidents, and submitting malicious
software and facilitate damage assessment.235 As part of safeguarding critical information, this regulation also requires contractors and applicable
subcontractors to implement NIST SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations.236

Emergent Regulations: Cybersecurity Maturity Model
Certification (CMMC)
Performance, cost, and schedule alone are insufficient for evaluating suppliers; supplier cybersecurity posture should be included as an equally essential
element of the evaluation process. This sentiment was expressed by the joint
testimony of the DOD before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
where C-SCRM in the DOD’s supply chain was addressed:237
to elevate the private sector’s focus on security, the Department
has established a “Deliver Uncompromised” initiative focused on
industry delivery of capabilities, services, technologies, and weapons systems that are uncompromised by our malign actors from
cradle-to-grave. It aims to establish security as a fourth pillar in
acquisition, on par with cost, schedule, and performance, and to
create incentives for industry to embrace security, not as a “cost
center,” but as a key differentiator.238

Additionally, the testimony outlined a shift from a compliance-based
checklist to a holistic and risk-based approach that is fluid based on current
threats and DOD priorities. This pivot also involved creating a plan to protect
controlled unclassified information (CUI) that is made available to private
industry suppliers. The testimony additionally identified that the integrity
of the supply chain needs to be strengthened and that DOD is actively in the
process of implementing requirements.
One of these emerging requirements is the DODI 5000.02, Operation of
the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, dated 23 January 2020, which emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity throughout the acquisition process.239
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DODI 5000.02 tasks program managers with the responsibility of recognizing that a critical part of program planning is cybersecurity. Per the DODI
5000.02:
[cybersecurity] must be addressed early and continuously during the
program life cycle to ensure cybersecurity operational and technical
risks are identified and reduced and that fielded systems are capable,
effective, and resilient.240

DODI 5000.02 also provides the transition plan from existing policies to
reissued or new policy documents including cybersecurity instructions. The
DOD plans to issue a new policy DODI 5000.CS, Cybersecurity for Acquisition
Decision Authorities and Program Managers, that highlights how cybersecurity should be considered in an acquisition.
There were still gaps in the protection of controlled defense information
even after the implementation of both the Framework and DFARS 252.2047012. The Framework was designed to be voluntary and as such had no
enforcement capabilities if companies failed to comply. DFARS 252.2047012 also presented some challenges, notably, it lacked uniform security, and
cybersecurity practices implemented by the defense industrial base (DIB)
were inconsistent.241 Additionally, contractors can demonstrate compliance
simply through self-certifications.242
Given these concerns, recommendations emerged for the DOD to use
third-party assessors to ensure compliance with cybersecurity regulations,
rather than self-certifications.243 The result of this is a new cybersecurity
assessment model, the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC),
published in early 2020, which provides the DOD the capability of certifying companies at different levels of certifications based upon the supplier’s
cybersecurity posture maturity.244 The CMMC essentially combines disparate
cybersecurity requirements into a single unified standard that can then be
applied to the entirety of the DIB supply chain and assessed through thirdparty assessors.245
The CMMC was designed to strengthen the protection of CUI and federal
contract information (FCI) within the DIB supply chain.246 Instead of being
a fourth pillar in the acquisition process, along with cost, schedule, and performance, cybersecurity is now considered a foundational requirement.247
The CMMC effectively shifts from voluntary self-reporting to standards that
are measurable and mandatory.248 The DOD now uses the CMMC levels as
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a requirement for contract awards by incorporating the CMMC into the
DFARS, issuing an interim rule change to amend DFARS 252.204.7012 in
September 2020.249 The CMMC will apply to both prime and subcontractors,
with prime contractors flowing the relevant requirements down to subcontractors. However, a subcontractor may not be required to have a higher-level
certification if they are not working with CUI.250 Requirements are being
phased in so that DIB contractors can adjust over the next five years with full
implementation in new DOD contracts occurring by 2026.251 Current contracts will not be impacted. CMMC Level requirements will be included in
request for information (RFI) and request for proposals (RFP) and as a condition of award, the appropriate level must be achieved. Under the CMMC,
contractors will no longer be able to self-attest as they did under DFARS
252.204-7012; instead, a new independent non-profit CMMC accreditation
body will oversee assessment organizations that will employ field licensed
assessors.252 These assessors will then evaluate companies wishing to bid on
DOD contracts. Companies must submit to CMMC evaluation every three
years. If a company produces only COTS products, CMMC certification
will not be required. Figure 3 graphically depicts the five CMMC levels.253
The CMMC incorporates several existing frameworks and standards. For

Figure 3. CMMC. Derivative from CMMC Version 1.02, created by authors.

example, levels 1-3 correspond to NISTS 800-171 Rev 1 with additional processes and practices incorporated from other frameworks and standards. The
model incorporates five levels of cybersecurity maturity of a company and,
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depending on the information to be protected and related threats, provides
recommended practices and processes. Practices and processes are organized
into domain sets and align to the five levels. Additionally, practices are associated with sets of capabilities within each domain. A company certified to
level 1 has processes that are performed and basic cyber hygiene sufficient
for the safeguard of FCI, as demonstrated in figure 3. Companies at level 2
have documented processes, they possess intermediate cyber hygiene, and
is a maturity transition level progression towards protection of CUI. Level
2 is where the DOD expects mostly small businesses to establish processes
and plan for the future. Companies at level 3 have managed processes with
good cyber hygiene suitable for the protection of CUI. At level 4, a company’s
processes are reviewed and have proactive practices. At level 5, a company’s
processes are said to be optimizing and their practices are advanced/progressive. For both level 4 and 5, the focus is not just to protect CUI but to reduce
the risk of advanced persistent threats.254 It is anticipated that the model will
change and evolve as threats change over time.
CMMC covers 17 domains drawn from the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 200 security-related areas and also from associated security requirements in NIST 800-171, as well as other regulations.255
The domains include access control, asset management, audit and accountability, awareness and training, configuration management, identification
and authentication, incident response, maintenance, media protection, personnel security, physical protection, recovery, risk management, security
assessment, situational awareness, systems and communications protections, and system and information integrity.256 Each domain has associated
capabilities, e.g., for access control, capabilities include establishing system
access requirements, control of internal system access, control remote system
access, and limit data access to authorized users and processes. In total there
are 43 capabilities associated with the 17 domains.257
Although the CMMC moves acquisition toward more stringent requirements, some have argued that it is not without potential problems. The
accreditation body website258 indicates that there are over 350,000 companies
that will have to be assessed, and 10,000 trained assessors will be needed.
The companies themselves must bear the cost of assessment, which may
be problematic for small- and medium-size non-defense companies who
are operating at low margins.259 Also, there is no clear oversight to determine whether assessments are administered fairly, particularly when it is
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the company that is paying the assessors.260 Finally, there is a possibility of
legal disputes when a company is denied a certification; the potential arises
for them to bid on a contract which they have worked on for months or even
years.261 It is not clear what happens if a company loses certification in the
middle of performance. Does this result in contract termination? Who bears
the burden of costs for litigation?
The DOD’s position is that the CMMC helps small businesses and that
the current self-certification makes competition uneven for small businesses. Under CMMC, the certification level provides a noticeably clear
go/no-go decision point; CMMC level 1 has
basic cyber hygiene practices which should be
The DOD’s position
low-cost to implement. Another idea to assist
is that the CMMC
small businesses is for primes to allow smaller
helps small businesses
subcontractors to operate in the prime’s secure
and that the current
environment, rather than establishing their own
self-certification makes
cybersecurity infrastructure.
competition uneven
for small businesses.

Takeaways for the SOF Community

Government acquisition regulations and guidelines are in a fluid state.
Although DFARS Clause 252.204-7012 and NIST’s Framework provide
mechanisms for mitigating threats, clearly, they are insufficient, given
the changing natures of supply chains and modernization of warfighting
technologies. The CMMC, once fully implemented, is expected to provide
additional mechanisms for securing the supply chain through third-party
vetting of suppliers. However, the CMMC is not a panacea. It is a large-scale
change which is likely to have to have tertiary effects on procurers as well as
suppliers, as described above. So, while the CMMC may indeed strengthen
elements of the supply chain, it may have unintended negative effects on
parts of the supply chain that once relied upon—in particular—small- and
medium-sized businesses.
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Chapter 5. The Hyper-Enabled Operator
(HEO) and the Supply Chain

P

resented now is a scenario of a hypothetical future HEO who is integrated into an ICT battlefield system that includes personal wearables,
weapon systems, vehicles, and other equipment—all of which are equipped
with IoBT smart, portable, network-connected sensors allowing for the near
real-time collection and processing of data. The warfighter’s IoBT includes
wearable biometric devices that collect data on the physical and mental
state of the warfighter, as well as environmental conditions. These sensors
continuously collect context data about the warfighter, equipment, and the
environment; the data is aggregated, synthesized, and transmitted upstream
to command for feedback and decision-making purposes as demonstrated
in figure 4.262 For simplicity we assume that the IoBT are custom designed
and manufactured devices but that also contain some COTS hardware components and software.

Figure 4. Integrated HEO System. Derivative from IEEE Cloud Computing article,
created by authors.
45

JSOU Report 21 -3
As noted earlier, there has been a shift within the DOD to gravitate
toward COTS products where feasible and practical. The DOD’s acquisition life cycle differs in terminology than that of their suppliers. While
the names of the life cycle stages may be different between companies, the
stages themselves are similar, are applicable to program-specific products
or COTS, and are for both prime and subcontracts. For the scenario, the
authors use a unified model of life cycle terminology developed by researchers and graphically depicted earlier in figure 2. The researchers identified the
most common terminology used for COTS hardware and software product
life cycles through a literature review from government agencies acquisition procedures, industry standards, and academic literature.263 They used
the recurrent terminology to create a single unifying model with common
terminology. Differences in terminology emerged between hardware and
software, so slightly different product life cycle terminology exists between
the two. Seven distinct product life cycle stages were identified:
1. requirements
2. design
3. manufacturing for hardware and development for software
4. testing
5. distribution
6. use and maintenance
7. disposal for both hardware and software264
The unified terminology, definitions, and relationship of the life cycle
stages are presented in figure 5.265

Attack Vectors Across the Product Life Cycle
In this section, for each life cycle stage we identify potential vulnerabilities
and cyberattacks, historical examples of vulnerabilities and cyberattacks,
and hypothetical attacks against the future warfighter on the battlefield.
For hypothetical attacks on the warfighter, we describe unique attacks at
each stage so as to not duplicate attacks across multiple stages; in real-world
attacks, however, the same attack could be relevant across multiple stages.
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Figure 5. Product Lifecycle Model. Derivative from Sandia Report by authors.

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering commissioned research to investigate potential attacks on the supply
chain across each of the product life cycle stages.266 This research culminated
in an extensive catalog of attacks for each of the life cycle stages, with the
number of potential attacks in a life cycle stage indicating the relative vulnerability or risk of that stage to cyber compromise. The relative frequency of
catalogued attacks were then used by others to quantify the relative risk of
each life cycle stage to attack using theoretical weights. Figure 6267 displays
theoretical risk weightings—i.e., potentials for attacks—across each stage
of the life cycle.268
Figure 6 illustrates the comparative theoretical risks to hardware and
software across the product life cycle. Adding all weights across the stages
adds to 1.0, providing a relative comparison between life cycle stages, and
comparisons between software and hardware within a life cycle stage. The
lowest weights are .05 for the requirements stage for both hardware and
software. The highest weight for software, .25, is the distribution stage; for
hardware, .30 is the manufacturing stage. These data points, while theoretical, are representative of the historical cyberattacks described earlier. During
the manufacture of hardware—e.g., motherboards, electronic components,
etc.—malign actors can substitute counterfeit components, add additional
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Figure 6. Cyber Supply Chain Risk Weighting (Software vs. Hardware).
Graphic created from data in Sandia Report by authors.

electronic components that provide remote access, or install malicious firmware.269 Likewise, the software distribution stage can result in highest level
of threat during initial software distribution or during the software update
stage through the addition of malicious code. The following are descriptions
of each of the aforementioned seven life cycle stages along with their cyber
threats and risks; where applicable, actual examples of cyberattacks; and
finally, hypothetical cyber threats to the integrated warfighter.
1. Requirements. The requirements stage is where the abstract capabilities
of the product are identified, based on the needs of the mission. This
stage may evolve from a “concept” stage which is a more amorphous
description of functionality required for a mission. For programspecific solutions, this is the phase where the government’s acquiring
agency or department would define requirements based on identified
needs. Specific requirements would be identified, and RFPs issued.
Risks. Risks are considered low in this stage, as requirements may
undergo numerous iterative reviews which would likely reveal malicious intent.270 Data rights assertions can identify the extent to which
a program-specific product uses open source software as one way of
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assessing risk in the requirements stage. A potential issue may arise
once requirements are identified, a supplier for a COTS product has
been selected, and systems have been purchased and fielded: the supplier may be acquired by a non-U.S. competitor—or worse, a potential
adversary—which may cause mission disruptions. For instance, in
2014 Lenovo Group, a Chinese computer manufacturing company,
purchased IBM’s low-end server business for $2.3 billion. These servers
were installed, and an integral part of, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis Combat
System.271 The primary concern for the Navy was that the servers
could be potentially compromised during routine maintenance, such
as hardware and/or software upgrades, which would be provided by
Lenovo.272 Additionally, there was a concern that information on the
weapons system could be accessed remotely by Chinese government
agents through a backdoor.273 Due to these concerns, the Program
Executive Office (PEO) for Integrated Warfare Systems’ Aegis program
office—and the manufacturer of the Aegis Combat System, Lockheed
Martin—were required to evaluate alternate hardware solutions to
mitigate the impact of the sale.274 In 2016, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff
warned the DOD and their personnel against purchasing any computers manufactured by Lenovo.275 An internal report by the J-2 intelligence directorate stated that cybersecurity officials were concerned
that these devices could introduce compromised hardware into the
DOD’s supply chain—helping China by facilitating cyber intelligence
gathering against both classified and unclassified DOD networks.276
While the requirements stage is one of the stages least likely to fall
under compromise, it is not immune. For instance, during requirements development the descriptions of an IoBT’s capabilities may
be altered or misrepresented—potentially causing inaccuracies in
derived system requirements.277 Thus, the IoBT may not fully encompass all the functionality as initially conceptualized by the procurer,
or functionality may not appear as originally conceptualized. Also, a
malign actor may distort software requirements, resulting in errors
in the design stage—which again affect the IoBT to fully encompass
all functionality as originally conceptualized and required by mission
needs.278 It would be reasonable to conclude that insiders would have
the best chance of carrying out these types of attacks.
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2. Design. The design stage is where activities are engaged to meet the
specified requirements, and abstract capabilities from the requirements
stage are combined with additional details of the product’s components
and functionality by designers and engineers.279 Vulnerabilities may
result from intentional acts from malign actors, or non-malicious
bad decisions by suppliers. Secure software design is a fundamental
part of critical systems where a primary objective is to produce a
system that has the necessary authentication, authorization, confidentiality, data integrity, and availability as specified by the product
requirements.280 Authentication is defined as a user providing proof
of identify to a system, through username and password, personal
identification number, or biometric, etc.; authorization is defined as
the process that ensures that a user has access only to those files and
system functions required to perform their job, and no more.281 Insufficient detail to these requirements can result in some of the issues
described previously, such as when DOD system testers identified
multiple vulnerabilities in DOD weapons systems, and were able to
successfully penetrate the systems.282
Risks. Risks in the design stage may just as likely to be caused by
unintentional non-malicious acts as intentional acts. Unintentional
non-malicious acts may be due to lack of due diligence to speed up
production and meet product schedules. From a software perspective,
examples include the selection of an inappropriate algorithm; failure
to implement error handling in code; or failure to include mechanisms
for encryption or digital signing, which can cause the information
leakage.283 On the hardware side, components selected may become
obsolete by the time a system is fielded, and OEM components may
no longer be available, forcing the DOD to purchase from suppliers
where “pedigree is less secure, and provenance is more difficult to track
using current procedures.”284 This is a real concern—as approximately
70 percent of electronics in fielded weapons systems are obsolete or
no longer in production prior to fielding the systems.285
As mentioned above, the design stage can be affected by compromises in the software requirements stage. For instance, a malign actor
with access to requirements specifications and/or software design
processes and tools can alter them to cause errors in system design.286
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The result is that the IoBT may not encompass the full functionality
as originally conceptualized. Software developers could also fail to
implement error handling in the source code, causing IoBT devices
to malfunction and provide inaccurate data, or become inoperable.
Inaccurate data may be a bigger problem as data are aggregated, synthesized, and directed upstream to command to provide decision
makers with an inaccurate picture of the battlefield.
3. Hardware Manufacturing and Software Development. Software
development is the process of producing source code which is then
compiled into executable code that supports the intended functionality identified in the requirements and design stages.287 Hardware
manufacturing involves the concrete production of the specified design
through assembled components. In this stage, multiple tiers of the
supply chain provide hardware components or subsystems that are
then fabricated and assembled into the final product.288
Risks. Manufacture of hardware is normally the most complex stage
of the hardware life cycle as it involves the most participants and
activities.289 Consequently, there are more potential attack vectors
at this stage. Hardware implants—such as extra electronic microchips included on the motherboard that were not part of the original
design—can be added, as the Supermicro story described earlier. But
this is not a unique case. In 2010, computer manufacturing company
Dell acknowledged that some of its PowerEdge servers shipped with
malware installed on the motherboard’s embedded server management firmware.290 Unfortunately, there is little detail published on the
type of malware or its intended function, but the fact that the malware
was found on the server management board (SMB) suggests that the
malware might have functioned as a backdoor given the purpose of
the SMB is to provide remote access to an authorized administrator.
Given that the servers shipped with the malware installed, one might
surmise that an insider infected the motherboards, or a third-party
supplier was the source. Regardless, this was clearly a supply chain
attack.
It is a truism that as system complexity increases, there is an attendant requirement for more lines of source code. Complex systems
can contain millions of lines of source code.291 Estimates vary on the
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number of security issues, i.e., “bugs,” identified per line of source code,
but they range from one bug per 1,000 lines of well-written code up
to 25 per 1,000 lines for less well-written code.292 Using the conservative estimate of one bug per 1,000 of lines of source code, one could
extrapolate that a large system with 20,000,000 lines of well-written
code could potentially contain 20,000 bugs. Each bug is a potential
vulnerability which could affect warfighters’ capabilities and mission
success. Although most security vulnerabilities in code are not placed
maliciously, the potential effects are the same.
In the introduction, there was a description of an early instance of
IoBT that involved U.S. Army helmets containing built-in sensors that
transmitted sensed data over networks to physicians, who could then
assist in diagnosing brain injuries.293 Future IoBT devices are likely
to include biometric sensors to measure the warfighter’s physical and
mental state, as well as environmental sensors, all of which provide
data that are aggregated and synthesized to provide the warfighter and
command with an accurate picture of the battlefield.294 Failure to use
encryption, or the use of weak encryption, could allow a malign actor to
intercept the data, providing the actor with insight on the warfighter’s
health, the warfighter’s systems in use, troop locations and movements,
etc. More problematic, the sensed data could be intercepted, modified,
and then transmitted upstream to the command level, providing a
false picture of the battlefield. On the hardware side, a malign actor
could substitute a modified microelectronics component containing
malicious logic, causing false data to be transmitted upstream, providing an unrealistic picture of battlefield and warfighter conditions. The
malign actor could also substitute counterfeit components that are less
reliable than OEM components, causing the units to fail more quickly.
4. Testing. Testing is the systematic assessment of the hardware and software separately, or the system as defined by the integrated hardware
and software package. Testing can be a complex activity depending
upon the level of testing required. Minimally, a system needs to be
tested to ensure that it performs the functions specified in the requirements stage and within designated performance minimums.
Risks. Testing is straightforward: run a series of tests to determine
if the system correctly performs the functions as specified in the
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requirements and design stages. As mentioned earlier, what is not
apparent is the answer to the question “what else can the system do?”
Malign actors can add malicious functionality to the source code,
which may be triggered by an event or condition. Alternatively, open
source code—e.g., common software libraries—may contain latent
vulnerabilities or malicious functionality.295, 296 Unless the source code
is available for review, it is difficult to identify all functionality if only
the compiled executable code is available.
Latent vulnerabilities often elude testing because most testing
involves ensuring that the system functions as specified, but may fail
to invoke circumstances which might render the system inoperable.
For instance, previously discussed was the story of a weapons system
that shutdown when DOD security testers performed a simple network
scan of the system.297 A network scan is one of the first activities that
malign actors perform when seeking to gain access and control a networked system. A network scan provides the actor with information
on what computers are connected and running on the network, as well
as what types of network traffic each computer is responding to (e.g.,
web network traffic, email network traffic, etc.). Accordingly, testing
should include functionality testing as well as other forms of testing
for activities that a potential malign actor may perform.
Systems often rely on input from humans—such as typing in a
text box, typing a keyboard combination, or reading data from other
systems. Software accepting data input from any source needs to be
tested for out-of-bounds conditions, such as data that is too little, too
much, or not in an acceptable format. If a system receives data in a
format not expected, it can cause the software to fail, or to behave in
an unexpected manner.298 Securely designed software is expected to
identify these conditions and handle them appropriately; if it doesn’t,
the system may not function as expected or become inoperable.
On the hardware side, counterfeit hardware parts may be identified
during quality assurance testing.299 Testing for malicious hardware
modification may require disassembling the system into its component
pieces, which is problematic on large scales.300 As discussed in the
introduction, the DOD noted that 15 percent of its parts were identified as counterfeit in the last decade.301
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Here is the scenario: an HEO has a weapon system outfitted with
an IoBT GPS sensor. The system passed testing in the U.S.; however,
a malign actor was able to insert malicious functionality—such as a
logic bomb—into the code during the software development stage,
or during the software update stage. The logic bomb’s code is set to
execute whenever the latitude and longitude indicate that the IoBT is
in enemy territory, causing the weapons system to provide false data,
or become inoperable.
5. Distribution. Distribution involves the packaging, warehousing, and
delivery of a product—system, component, or software—from supplier to end-user customers.302 For the hypothetical HEO scenario, it
is assumed that all hardware comes assembled and software installed
where appropriate. Distribution occurs through vetted freight forwarders and normal DOD distribution channels.
Risks. Potential risks occur during product initial shipping, as well as
shipping of replacement parts. Freight forwarders are normally vetted
by the government and are on an “approved” list; however, each additional layer in the shipping and storage process opens opportunities
for malign actors to intercept and modify the systems. As with testing,
shipping may also occur within other stages of the life cycle whenever
the final product or its components are in transit. For instance, shipping is also required during the maintenance and disposal stages, with
multiple participants supporting the transportation of the soon-to-be
retired system.303
Counterfeit parts or entire systems are another issue in the distribution stage. In 2008, Cisco—the largest manufacturer of network
routers304—admitted that its partners sold counterfeit Cisco products
to the U.S. military.305 In a leaked FBI PowerPoint presentation that
detailed “Operation Cisco Router,” the FBI identified the counterfeit
products came from Shenzhen, province of China, but were unable to
determine if the goods were made by state-sponsored malign actors,
or for entities that were for-profit. The FBI noted that the counterfeits
could open hardware backdoors, allowing an attacker to gain access
and control the router.306 Additionally, counterfeit products are known
to have higher failure rates than OEM equipment, with the FBI noting
that one of these counterfeit products caught fire in a government
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network due a faulty power supply.307 Additionally, one company was
cited for allegedly selling counterfeit products from China to the U.S.
Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), universities, financial institutions, defense contractors, and
the FBI.308
The FBI identified the supply chain issue, finding that Cisco did
little or no vetting of “Cisco partners”—noting that “silver” and “gold”
level partners were selling the products to the government. The FBI
also noted that these problems stem from long standing U.S. government practices of buying from the lowest bidder. At the time, a genuine
Cisco router cost $1,375, whereas "gray” market routers cost about a
sixth of that price—approximately $234.309 This example underscores
the issue previously described, where procurers may have no insight
as to who the participants are in the supply chain outside of the nearest participants.
Shipped items are commonly tracked through radio frequency
identification (RFID) tags. RFID are electronic tags that are attached
to or embedded in objects for identification and tracking purposes.310
Components embedded with RFID tags can be tracked using RFID
readers that are placed along the distribution path. When an RFID
tag is read by an RFID reader, information on product identification
and location is transmitted over networks back to the organization for
tracking purposes. The security of this information—confidentiality,
integrity, and availability—is only as good as the security of the networks over which data are traveling. Imagine several thousand IoBT
devices shipped to a battle zone. If a malign actor intercepted RFID
data traveling over a network, it might allow the actor to determine
the product being shipped, their destination, the number of products
in the shipment—and therefore, estimates of number of troops and
their locations, etc. This would provide the malign actor with insight
on sensitive battlefield operational plans and capabilities.
6. Use and Maintenance. During this stage, the end user will make use
of the system for its intended functionality, and maintain it to ensure it
continues to function. Hardware systems often require maintenance,
including regular physical maintenance (e.g., cleaning), and replacing
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malfunctioning or worn components. Software updates are common
to patch security issues or add additional functionality to a system.
Risks. System misconfiguration—or, lack of configuration—may lead
to unseen vulnerabilities. For instance, systems are normally shipped
with a set of default credentials that allow the initial administrative
user to setup the system for deployment in the field. Changing the
default credentials should be an immediate task for the administrator, as leaving default credentials can lead to a malign actor’s ability
to access the system; as discussed previously, DOD testers were able
to gain access to weapons systems because default credentials were
not changed.311
Software Update Attacks. During this stage, users will maintain their
systems through security updates, updating the device’s operating
system, and installing additional software that also requires updates
to patch security issues on a regular basis. Most large software manufacturers use digital certificates312 to digitally sign software, ensuring
software is verified to be from the authentic source and that it has not
been modified from its original state. The digital signature process can
be thought of as a digital means of “notarizing” software, much like
a notary public authenticates signatures on legal documents. When
a user installs or updates software, this digital signature is checked
for authenticity. Normally, if a malign actor replaces or changes the
original file, either a warning message will display or the software
installation/update will fail to proceed, or both. Unfortunately, digital
certificates are not foolproof as a means of authentication. In 2011,
a malign actor—allegedly from Iran—was able to gain access to an
account from a trusted partner of the certificate authority313 Comodo.
The malign actor issued nine fraudulent digital certificates for several
domains, including mail.google.com, www.google.com, login.skype.
com, login.live.com, and several others.314
All major operating system and application manufacturers provide
regular software updates that remedy security or performance issues.
Moreover, many manufacturers support automatic updates so that
they occur without manual user intervention, and can be scheduled
for off-peak hours so that user activity is not disrupted. Malign actors
have exploited these two details to create software update supply chain
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attacks, which increased 78 percent between 2017 and 2018.315 A software update supply chain attack is defined as:
Implanting a piece of malware into an otherwise legitimate
software package at its usual distribution location; this can
occur during production at the software supplier, at a thirdparty storage location, or through redirection.316

Software update attacks are effective because they exploit a trusted
channel (the software manufacturer), and automatic updates allow
the malware infections to grow quickly without manual intervention
by the malign actor.
In 2019, a software update supply chain attack occurred that
involved malware on ASUS laptops. Ostensibly, the malign actors
leveraged a backdoor attack, modifying the ASUS Live Update Utility
that delivers software updates to laptops and desktops.317 The software
utility was digitally signed with a legitimate digital certificate and
hosted on an official ASUS server dedicated to providing updates to
ASUS computers.318 It was estimated that one million users downloaded
the utility. The fact that malign actors were able to leverage legitimate
digital certificates meant to ensure a file’s origin and integrity is cause
for alarm.
Ransomware. Another threat during this stage is ransomware. Ransomware, as described earlier in this monograph, is malware that
encrypts files on a computing device. The encryption is sufficiently
strong enough so that files cannot be decrypted without a decryption
key. In a civilian scenario, once the ransomware encrypts the files, a
message is presented to the user that explains what has occurred with
instructions on how to purchase a decryption key using some form
of anonymous cryptocurrency so that there can be no attribution
back to the identity of the malign actor(s).319 The ransomware payload—the actual malware that infects the host computer and encrypts
files—often arrives in the form of a legitimate appearing attachment
to an email (e.g., an invoice). Once the attachment is clicked by the
user, the ransomware silently starts the encryption process. The user
is normally unaware of the encryption running until it is too late.
Phishing emails are the primary attack vector for ransomware in the
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civilian domain, although there is the potential for ransomware to be
part of a software update.320
Most ransomware is written for versions of the Windows operating system—given that Windows holds 89 percent of total desktop/
laptop operating system market share—and therefore remains a bigger
target.321 Although strains of ransomware exist for Apple MacOS and
Linux operating systems, as of mid-2020 they are relatively rare; motivated, state-funded malign actors can with no doubt create a strain of
ransomware that could target a weapon or support systems running a
customized embedded Linux or other operating system. Additionally,
ransomware exists for the smart phone operating systems including
Android (72 percent market share as of 2020)322 and Apple iOS (27
percent market share as of 2020).323, 324
During 2018–2019, there were dozens of local governments that
were victimized by ransomware, including Atlanta, GA,325 Lakeland,
FL,326 Fort Lauderdale, FL,327 several Louisiana parishes,328 and over
20 local governments in Texas.329 According to the 2019 FBI Internet
Crime Report, there were 2,047 instances of ransomware reported in
that year.330 However, the number of reported cybercrimes may only
represent 10 to 12 percent of the actual total number committed in
the U.S. each year.331 Similar to the Maersk incident discussed previously in this monograph, the reason entire cities were affected by
ransomware is that they used versions of Microsoft Windows known
to have a vulnerability in its file sharing protocol—allowing a single
infected computer to automatically infect other systems across the
organization’s network.
Cybersecurity Issues with Cloud Services. Private and public companies and organizations are increasingly using cloud services. Cloud
services are on-demand services provided over the internet from the
cloud provider’s servers, obviating the need for an organization to
acquire and maintain their own servers and resulting in reduced costs
of acquisition and maintenance. Some of the more well-known cloud
service providers include Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure,
Google Cloud, Oracle Cloud, and IBM Cloud. Cloud services range
from software and storage on demand, all the way to providing a
company with an entire IT infrastructure. Larger corporations relying
on cloud services include Target, Walmart, Apple, General Electric,
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Instagram, and Netflix.332 One of the largest entities moving toward
use of the cloud is the DOD:
In September 2017, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a
memorandum calling for the accelerated adoption of a Department of Defense (DoD) enterprise-wide cloud services solution
as a fundamental component of ongoing DoD modernization
efforts.333

In 2018, the DOD published its DOD Cloud Strategy report, which
recognized the need for updating warfighter support through innovative technology, such as the cloud:
The Department of Defense (DoD) has entered the modern age
of warfighting where the battlefield exists as much in the digital
world as it does in the physical. Data and our ability to process
data at the ready are differentiators to ensure mission success.
Cloud is a fundamental component of the global infrastructure
that will empower the warfighter with data and is critical to
maintaining our military's technological advantage.334

The DOD’s growing use of the commercially available cloud services
to store and process highly classified data may improve warfighting
effectiveness and mission success, but it also provides an enormous
and increasing attack surface for malign actors to compromise—either
through external attacks or by malicious insiders employed by the
cloud providers. Cloud security provider Armor identified 621 million
attacks on cloud customers in 2018, including brute force password
attacks, attacks against vulnerable software, web application attacks,
and IoT attacks.335
The futuristic HEO is situated on the battlefield with multiple IoBT
devices and sensors feeding critical data to the warfighter, as well as
an upstream to command for battlefield assessment. An IoBT device
requires an update downloaded from a “secure” cloud server, and the
update is applied; however, a malign insider has modified the update
stored on the cloud server to include malicious code that encrypts
files after a set period of time. Suddenly, IoBT sensors no longer function—as the operating system files have been encrypted—rendering the
IoBT device inoperable. If these updates were automatically applied,
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that would mean all IoBT devices would be susceptible to the attack
as a matter of course.336 Or, the update contains malicious logic that
causes sensors to transmit inaccurate data to the warfighter and to
command, providing a false picture of the battlefield. On the hardware side, an IoBT device may malfunction due to faulty components,
but the OEM no longer manufacturers them, requiring the DOD to
procure from an alternative source which may not be as well vetted as
the OEM—increasing the potential for supply chain vulnerabilities.
7. Disposal. Disposal involves the decommissioning and removal of
a product at the end of its life.337 Hardware disposal involves disassembly for reuse, recycling, or destruction, and software disposal
includes uninstalling, deleting, or otherwise discontinuing the use of
the product.338 Software disposal requires permanently removing all
remnants of software and data from storage devices.
Risks. The number one threat in the disposal stage can be caused by
the lack of due diligence in not securely deleting sensitive files from
a system’s storage device, usually a hard drive. The secure deletion
process can be a complicated activity for non-technical users. All
computing and electronic devices and media should be subjected to
secure deletion procedures, including storage devices such as hard
drives and external media such as flash drives, CDs, DVDs, etc., upon
disposal.339
The average person thinks that the act of deleting a file permanently
removes that file; it does not. When a user deletes a file, all operating
systems—regardless of the type of storage device—changes a single
“flag” residing in the metadata of the file, and that flag informs the
operating system that the storage space used by that file can now be
reused if and when necessary.340 The original file will remain intact
and is recoverable until overwritten by more data.341, 342 Anyone with
a cyber forensics background can easily recover files deleted from a
storage device. The most common way to securely delete a file is to
overwrite that file with more data.343 Even with secure delete programs,
research has shown that the effectiveness can be spotty, leaving traces
of the original file.344 Governmental agencies, including the DOD and
intelligence agencies, have their own guidelines for securely deleting
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data—some of which include physical destruction of the device which
stored highly sensitive information.345
At some point in time, the HEO’s IoBT devices will become obsolete, permanently malfunction, or become degraded in some other way.
Since these devices are likely to still store information, they will need
to be disposed of securely. Note that disposal requires transportation
to the location at which the systems will be disassembled, and storage devices securely erased. During transportation, systems could be
intercepted and data read from the devices. Also, the compiled code
could be extracted and reverse engineered to determine how it functions, which could then be used for future attacks by malign actors.

Takeaways for the SOF Community
Much of the literature would suggest that supply chain attacks begin and
end at acquisition and procurement. Clearly, this is an understandably
myopic view of the possibilities of cyber compromise for a weapons or support system. Just as important are the manufacturing/development, use/
maintenance, and disposal stages of the product life cycle. As government
regulations seek to improve mitigation strategies for cyber compromise
during acquisition and procurement, they force malign actors to identify
new attack vectors for the system compromise. Additionally, the expanded
use of cloud services will create a concomitant increase of the DOD’s attack
surface. The SOF community must be vigilant regarding the manufacturing/development, use/maintenance, and disposal stages, ensuring that these
stages are also covered by appropriate regulations and guidelines to reduce
the likelihood of compromise.
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Chapter 6. SOF Acquisition

A

s the threats and understanding of C-SCRM evolve, so does the DOD
response to it. Two themes have emerged from recent updates. First,
cybersecurity has been recognized as foundational and should be a consideration across a products’ life cycle. Second, while SOF has long recognized
the need for rapid acquisitions, the entire DOD is also moving towards
more nimble acquisition processes. This section will review what makes
SOF acquisition unique, and will discuss some of the evolving and emergent
tools and processes that will assist SOF with C-SCRM moving forward.

SOF Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L)
The SOF community spans the globe, conducting critical missions and—
where the need for operational success is paramount—SOF operators use
sophisticated and unique solutions.346 It is also imperative to get that equipment to the operator quickly. James Guerts, a former United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) acquisition executive, summarized
the SOF needs in January 2016: “Velocity is my combat advantage. Iteration
speed is what I’m after, because if I can go five times faster than you, I can
fail four times and still beat you to the target. … That's really what we're
going after here.”347
The SOF Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Center, established in
1991, is responsible for all USSOCOM research, development, acquisition,
procurement, and logistics. It works closely with industry, academia, and
government to provide rapid and focused acquisition, technology, and logistics support to warfighters.348 SOF AT&L consists of eight PEOs: Command,
Control, Communications, and Computers; Fixed Wing; Maritime; Rotary
Wing; SOF Digital Applications; SOF Support Activity; SOF Warrior; Services; and Special Reconnaissance.349 There are also four Directorates: Comptroller; Logistics; Procurement; and Science & Technology.350 Underlying the
mission is the SOF acquisition process, unique to the USSOCOM, which is
more streamlined than other service branches, allowing for quick delivery
of modern capabilities.351 The SOF AT&L accelerates its force and executes
its mission by following four key acquisition principles:
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1. Delivers capability to the user expeditiously;
2. Exploits proven techniques and methods;
3. Keeps warfighters involved throughout the process; and
4. Takes risk and manages it.352
Recent changes announced by the DOD should also provide additional
support for the acquisition velocity that is critical to SOF, as noted by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment: “I’m very proud
of our Adaptive Acquisition Framework, because I believe it enables DOD
to simplify and speed up the acquisition process. The six different acquisition pathways provide flexibility to apply acquisition authorities and various
contract types in a creatively compliant manner." Additional acquisition
instructions that have also been updated, signed, and issued include DODI
5010.44, Intellectual Property Acquisition and Licensing Policy; DODI 5000.74,
Defense Acquisition of Services; DODI 500.80, Operation of Middle-tier of
Acquisition; and DODI 5000.81, Urgent Capability Acquisition and Software
Acquisition Interim Policy. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment noted that the DOD was close to finishing
DODI 5000.01, Defense Acquisition Regulation.353
Another mechanism that allows SOF to be responsive in meeting mission
needs is through Other Transaction Agreements, sometimes referred to as
OTAs.354 OTAs provide the flexibility to incorporate commercial industry
best practices and standards into awards to develop innovative solutions
using both traditional and non-traditional defense contractors as OTAs
are easily tailorable.355 There are three types of OTA agreements: research,
prototype, and production. OTAs are not Federal Acquisition Regulationbased procurement contracts, nor are they considered grants, cooperative
agreements, or cooperative research and development agreements.356 OTAs
historically were seldom used, however in the last few years they have become
much more prevalent in DOD acquisitions.357 The SOFWERX organization,
for example, use OTAs as one of their contracting methods.358

SOFWERX
Another way to address future warfighter needs with innovative solutions is
through the SOFWERX organization. The SOFWERX platform was created
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to solve warfighter challenges through a Partnership Intermediary Agreement between USSOCOM and DEFENSEWERX and is a public facing emissary. SOFWERX describes its mission as two-fold: “1) Create and maintain a
platform to accelerate delivery of innovative capabilities to USSOCOM and
2) Facilitate capability refinement through exploration, experimentation and
assessment of promising technology.”359 SOFWERX brings together different
entities including government, labs, industry, and academia. SOFWERX
showed how they bring these different entities together to solve future warfighter problems during one recent event—the Innovation Foundry—held on
10–12 March 2020, which was designed to help USSOCOM identify future
capabilities areas for Unconventional Warfare for further technical exploration.360 Within SOFWERX is the Foundry, a workshop for rapid prototyping
and provides tools such as 3D printers, welding, and grinders among other
manufacturing tools.361
SOFWERX also has a responsive acquisition process to rapidly field solutions for warfighters. For example, one event involved Science and Technology Small Business Innovation Research 20.1 Phase I—which solicited grant
applications and proposals to address needs related to a platform agnostic
data storage infrastructure and Multi-Full Motion Video Fusion 3D capability—among other topics.362 The event outcomes demonstrate the commitment to speed, as proposals were evaluated within 30 days and the Small
Business Innovation Research evaluation team anticipates contract awards
within 90 days.363

Additional Tools and Processes for Incorporating Cybersecurity
in Acquisition
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) created a tool and associated training called the Cybersecurity and Acquisition Lifecycle Integration Tool
(CALIT) to help program and acquisition professionals understand cybersecurity across a product’s life cycle.364 CALIT provides a visual way to
understand how these processes interact in order develop cyber-resilient
weapon systems.365
The DOD’s Cyber Security and Information Systems Information Analysis Center developed a detailed chart that visually depicts the myriad of
government-issued cybersecurity-related policies and regulations.366 The
DOD Cybersecurity Chart identifies the numerous applicable cybersecurity
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policies to visually organize and simplify the information. The chart covers
different cybersecurity activities or requirements, such as Secure Data in
Transit or Strengthen Cyber Readiness, and are organized under five main
categories: Organize, Enable, Anticipate, Prepare, and Authorities. The
authorities section provides the legal authorities, policies, operational and
subordinate documents that apply.367
In 2019, the DOD released DOD Enterprise DevSecOps Initiative, a new
initiative to shift software to faster and more secure development processes.368
Development, Security, and Operations (DevSecOps) combines industry best
practices to create responsive and secure Government software factories.
Under DevSecOps, automated standards, tools, and services will permit
the rapid development, deployment, and operations of software applications
which are interoperable, flexible, and secure.369 Additionally, DevSecOps uses
a cloud environment permitting the DOD to develop and share capabilities
seamlessly. This approach allows small businesses to operate within a secure
government environment rather than establishing their own cybersecurity
infrastructures. This potentially could help alleviate concerns about the
CMMC being a barrier to entry for small businesses.
A companion document to DevSecOps is planned for release that will
incorporate security language understandable to auditors who are assigned
with accrediting software.370 A key recognition in the new initiative is that
the DevSecOps approach will help remedy the issue in legacy software
development practices where cybersecurity has not been a primary concern. DevSecOps shifts incorporating cybersecurity throughout the software
development process—from separate, discrete functions to a cross-functional
model—where these skill sets work in parallel using a continuous monitoring
approach.371 With DevSecOps, cybersecurity is continuously monitored and
applied across the software’s life cycle.
The DOD released OSD DevSecOps Best Practice Guide Version 1.0, dated
15 January 2020, to assist in the transition to DevSecOps.372 This best practice
guide aids the DOD shifting to DevSecOps, focusing not only on the technical aspects of software development, but the necessity of “organizational
cultural changes” that must occur for its successful implementation. While
it is reasonable to conclude that a culture changes slowly—and that DOD, as
a whole, may take time to transition—the changes that are occurring and the
tools that are available can help SOF continue to respond to the mission: supporting the warfighters current and future needs with acquisitions that can
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be supported at the appropriate velocity with products and solutions that are
delivered uncompromised in order to help the SOF achieve mission success.

Takeaways for the SOF Community
The current SOF acquisition process is unique across the military services.
Speed and responsiveness to warfighter needs are important goals. SOF
AT&L and SOFWERX provide SOF with the ability to rapidly respond to
emergent threats and crises. The introduction of DevSecOps is likely to
reduce the attack surface for software, as cybersecurity is no longer an afterthought as with legacy software development, but a required component
where security is given its due from the beginning of design all the way
through the software development life cycle. Additionally, tools such as the
DAU’s CALIT and the DOD Cybersecurity Chart provide additional assistance to acquisition personnel in assisting in understanding cybersecurity
and acquisition regulations.
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Conclusions and the Future of SOF
Acquisition

A

s the Maersk incident illustrates, cyberattacks can have tremendous
real-world consequences on the supply chain—consequences that could
have profound implications for mission success if delivery of needed supplies,
equipment, and information is disrupted. SOF rely on increasingly sophisticated hardware and software-driven products, such as the IoBT, which
leaves warfighters vulnerable to an increasingly large attack surface. Current
and future warfighting technologies will use even more diverse technologies and components—sourced from global tiered supply chains—making
it difficult to ascertain the authenticity of parts and the cyber-resiliency of
components, parts, and software. As such, the attack surface is only likely
to increase in the future.
Shifts to the DOD’s acquisition strategies have also made it increasingly difficult to determine cyber risks in products and software. The shift
from traditional program-specific products and manufactured systems to a
strategy of using more COTS products—alone, or incorporated into other
products—leaves SOF with reduced insight and control into the design and
development process of lower-tier suppliers. The benefits of the global supply
chain—such as interoperability, and rapid innovation—are all benefits that
also threaten the cyber-resilience of products. All these factors combine
to present SOF with potential supply chain vulnerabilities through either
intentional acts by malign actors, or unintentional acts by suppliers with the
potential to negatively impact mission outcomes.
The SOF supply chain is under increasing threats of cyber compromise, as
modern warfare has moved to blended operations. The potential for military
disruptions is high, as malign actors continue to use multiple threat vectors.
Attack vectors include the supply chain, cyber-physical systems, cyber IT,
and the human domain. Human domain attacks are perniciously malicious;
they take advantage of weaknesses in the psychology of humans, which can
only be mitigated through training, education, and awareness programs,
combined with healthy doses of vigilance and skepticism.
The notion of cyber-resiliency through C-SCRM is evolving to manage
cybersecurity risks in the supply chain. While initially focused on IT
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cybersecurity, over the last 20 years C-SCRM has evolved into a blended
discipline of cybersecurity, SCM, and risk management. Just as the academic
literature has evolved in their understanding of C-SCRM, so has the government’s—and, more specifically, the DOD’s understanding of C-SCRM.
Managing the supply chain to ensure products are delivered uncompromised
is critical to SOF mission success. As the DOD transitions to DODI 5000.02,
Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, greater importance has
been placed on cybersecurity being a foundational element throughout the
acquisition process, which specifically addresses that program managers
need to recognize cybersecurity as a critical part of program planning. DODI
5000.CS, Cybersecurity for Acquisition Decision Authorities and Program
Managers, a forthcoming policy identified in DODI 5000.02, is intended
to provide guidance for acquisitions and program managers on managing
cybersecurity in acquisitions. The CMMC defines cybersecurity as a foundational element for suppliers, requiring third-party assessors to evaluate
suppliers—and it is a way forward for the DOD to manage cyber supply chain
risks. The emergent CMMC guidelines will ensure that the DOD has greater
assurances that the government’s FCI and CUI data will be protected in the
supply chain—as CMMC levels will be specified in RFIs and RFPs—with
firms needing to be certified at the level specified to be competitive. The
requirement for a certain certification level will flow down from primes to
subcontractors as well, putting a greater onus on prime and subcontractors
to be responsible for their supplier’s cybersecurity posture.
Concerns exist about the implementation of the CMMC—and given
that it is emerging, some questions are still outstanding. Concerns do exist
about the size and number of companies needing auditing and number of
assessors needed to conduct the certifications. The expense of accreditation
that companies pay for is of concern, especially for small businesses. With
the current structure, there is no oversight to determine the fairness of an
evaluation. Legal questions still exist, e.g., what happens if a certification is
lost by a contractor in the middle of contract performance, or what if the
inability to bid on future programs is lost.
SOF AT&L has strategically used legacy acquisition strategies to ensure
speed of delivery of products needed to support the warfighter. The DOD
transition to the DODI 5000.02, Adaptive Acquisition Framework should
allow the SOF community new methods to ensure that mission critical
products can be acquired and delivered quickly and securely. Further, the
70

Craiger, Craiger, and Zorri: Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management
adoption of the CMMC into the acquisition process ensures that cybersecurity is foundational in a product’s life cycle. It is reasonable to conclude that
while the CMMC was designed to protect FCI and CUI, the more mature
and advanced an organization’s cybersecurity posture is, the more likely that
other cybersecurity threats—not related to FCI and CUI—can be mitigated
or prevented. The new emphasis on product life cycle cybersecurity, management of the supply chains, and more responsive acquisitions within DOD
itself will strengthen SOF’s ability to more quickly deliver uncompromised,
mission-critical products needed by SOF warfighters.
All these measures paint the picture that the DOD is moving toward
a holistic life cycle approach to managing cyber supply chain risks. The
DOD is shifting its posture on cybersecurity from one where cybersecurity
is often an afterthought in products to being a foundational element incorporated throughout a products life cycle. The CMMC is intended to ensure
that cyber threats and risks in the supply chain are managed and there are
adequate controls to protect FCI and CUI. The government is also taking a
more secure and agile approach to software products by creating DevSecOps
factories for software development—which permits speedier development
than legacy methods—but on a more secure foundation. These changes,
when used together, demonstrate how all of these policies can work together
to manage cyber supply chain risks across a product’s life cycle.
Given the recent release of new and emergent regulations, it would appear
one recommendation moving forward is training, education, and awareness for all those involved in a product’s life cycle, not just acquisition or
cybersecurity professionals. Training could also be tailored to specific enduser groups. In addition to training, tools that help end-users conceptualize
cybersecurity and C-SCRM could be updated to reflect these changes. For
example, CALIT, which shows how cybersecurity fits along a product’s life
cycle, could be updated to reflect the new policies and instructions. Likewise,
the DOD Cybersecurity Chart—which is a valuable resource to categorize
and map the various policies—could be updated and is a valuable tool to
demonstrate the “big picture” as to how all regulations fit into the product
life cycle. A highly educated workforce can provide knowledgeable professionals for acquisition teams and help ensure that cybersecurity risks in the
supply chain can be addressed throughout a product’s life cycle.
C-SCRM is still a new and fluid discipline, requiring continued revisions
to keep abreast of changing technologies and cybersecurity threats to the
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global supply chain. Now that a more collective understanding of C-SCRM
is emerging, it will hopefully be easier to measure and test the effectiveness
of these new standards. More research will permit the DOD, government,
industry partners, and academia to continue to improve the defenses against
malign actors wishing to harm the operational readiness and ability to successfully complete the mission for both the SOF warfighter and the DOD
as a whole.
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Acronyms
AT&L		

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

BEC		

business email compromise

C-SCRM

cyber supply chain risk management

CALIT		

Cybersecurity and Acquisition Lifecycle Integration Tool

CEO		

chief executive officer

CIA		

Central Intelligence Agency

CIO		

chief information officer

CMMC 		

Capability Maturity Model Certification

CNCI		

Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative

CNSSI		

Committee on National Security Systems Instruction

COTS		

commercial off-the-shelf

CPS		

cyber-physical system

CPU		

Central Processing Unit

CUI		

Controlled Unclassified Information

DAU		

Defense Acquisition University

DevSecOps

Development, Security, and Operations

DFARS		

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement

DHS		

United States Department of Homeland Security

DIACAP
DOD Information Assurance Certification and
		Accreditation Process
DIB		

Defense Industrial Base

DOD		

Department of Defense

DODI		

DOD Instruction
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EAC

email account compromise

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCI

Federal Contract Information

FCC

Federal Communications Commission

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GB

gigabyte

HEO

hyper-enabled operator

ICT

information communications technology

IoBT

Internet of Battlefield Things

IoT

Internet of Things

IP

internet protocol

IRS

U.S. Internal Revenue Service

IT

information technology

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NSA

National Security Agency

OT

operational technology

OTA

other transaction agreement

OEM

original equipment manufacturer

PEO

Program Executive Office

PPE

personal protective equipment

R&D

research and development

RFI

request for information

RFID

radio frequency identification tags
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RFP		

Request for Proposal

RMF		

Risk Management Framework

SCM		

supply chain management

SMB		

server management board

SOF		

Special Operations Forces

USSOCOM

U.S. Special Operations Command
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